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The dissertation is dedicated to two interconnected questions. First, I try to understand
how consumers choose from a set of complex pricing schemes. I design two lab experi-
ments that generate rich datasets allowing to address the question of interest. The most
interesting result comes from the second experiment, where in the set of pricing schemes
offered to subjects, one pricing scheme has a convex cost function at the possible de-
mand range, while all other pricing schemes have linear cost functions at this range. I
document a bias towards the pricing scheme associated with a convex cost function. The
second question is to understand how the observed consumer behavior affects pricing de-
cisions of profit-maximizing firms. I address this question by constructing a model where
a monopolist can price discriminate against consumers with different willingness to pay
and the same limited ability to compare market alternatives. In this model, it might
be profitable for the monopolist to include dominated offers (i.e. such offers that are
never chosen by rational consumers who can compare all available offers) in the menu of
pricing schemes. The main result is the necessary condition for this pricing strategy to be
profitable: consumers with a higher willingness to pay should be more likely to consider
dominated offers than consumers with a lower willingness to pay.
V této dizertační práci se věnuji dvěma propojeným problémům. Zaprvé se snažím
zjistit, jakým způsobem si spotřebitel vybírá z množiny komplexních cenových schémat.
Navrhuji dva laboratorní experimenty, ve kterých je vždy jedno cenové schéma s konvexní
nákladovou funkcí a ostatní mají lineární nákladovou funkci. V těchto experimentech
ukazuji, že rozhodování subjektů je vychýlené ve prospěch schématu s konvexní nák-
ladovou funkcí. Zadruhé se snažím porozumět, jak toto pozorované chování spotřebitele
ovlivňuje cenová rozhodnutí firem maximalizujících zisk. Tuto otázku řeĹˇím pomocí
modelu, kde monopolista může cenově diskriminovat spotřebitele na základě rozdílné
ochoty platit a dříve zmíněné omezené schopnosti porovnávat tržní alternativy. V tomto
modelu může být pro monopolistu výhodné zahrnout do cenových schémat dominované
cenové nabídky – tzn. nabídky, které by si racionální spotřebitel s možností porovnání
všech dostupných nabídek nikdy nevybral. Hlavním výsledkem je formulování nutné pod-
mínky, za které je taková cenová strategie zisková: spotřebitelé s vyšší ochotou platit musí





That’s been one of my mantras - focus and simplicity. Simple can be harder than
complex: You have to work hard to get your thinking clean to make it simple. But it’s
worth it in the end because once you get there, you can move mountains.
Steve Jobs
For decades, economic research has been based on the assumption of the individual
rationality of economic agents. Particularly, agents have been assumed to act according
to their well-defined preferences when making all kinds of individual choices. The most
convincing argument for relying on the rationality assumption is its analytical conve-
nience. When behavior of each agent has a formal mathematical representation, we can
study complex market interactions of agents, as well as the efficiency of possible market
structures and policy interventions. The rationality assumption guarantees the existence
of such formal mathematical representation.
My dissertation is an attempt to describe how boundedly rational consumers choose
from a set of complex pricing schemes and to study how the presence of such consumers
affects pricing strategies of a profit-maximizing monopolist. Bounded rationality is ar-
guably a more realistic version of how humans make decisions. Agents still have well-
defined preferences and are willing to maximize their well-being through the choices that
they make. If they can find the best alternative, they always take it. The problem is in
finding the best alternative when there are so many of them available on the market, and
their values are not immediately observable.
Other attempts to understand how economic agents find the best alternatives have
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been previously made by studying search behavior. Search models can be divided into
two categories, both of them representing alternative-based search, i.e. when alternatives
are evaluated one by one. The first one builds on the "satisficing" procedure proposed in
Simon 1955. This procedure assumes that once an economic agent finds an alternative
that sufficiently satisfies his desires, he takes it and stops searching. The term "aspiration
level" is used to characterize these desires. The aspiration level is an exogenous variable
in the original satisficing model, but it is endogenized in some of the later ones.
The other stream of search literature originates from the rational search-cost model
proposed in Stigler 1961. Within this approach, the optimal stopping rule is endogenous
and mathematically well defined. Particularly, economic agents are assumed to know the
distribution of their choice alternatives so that they can evaluate expected benefits and
costs of a further search. They continue searching as long as expected benefits are above
expected costs and stop searching when expected benefits drop below expected costs.
Both representations of search behavior mentioned above are a step forward from
the assumption that economic agents always choose the best available alternative, even
when they need to find it first. These representations are capable of explaining certain
patterns in observed market outcomes, e.g. why competing stores selling homogeneous
goods can charge different prices. In some cases, one representation is more powerful than
the other; in other cases, the reverse is true. There is still an important question that
neither representation addresses: What determines the order in which choice alternatives
are considered. In both types of models, there are no observables that can be used by
economic agents to structure the search process, while in practice, economic agents often
have some information on available alternatives before they start the search process.
I believe that by posing and partially answering questions related to ordering a search
process based on the observable characteristics of available alternatives, my dissertation
can move us towards a better understanding of important economic decisions made by
individual agents. My partial answer to the question is that economic agents look for a
match between their own characteristics and easily observable characteristics of available
alternatives. This determines the order in which alternatives are evaluated.
This dissertation consists of three interconnected essays listed chronologically. The
first two essays correspond to two lab experiments, and the third essay is a theoretical
study that builds upon the experimental findings to analyze optimal pricing strategies of
a profit-maximizing monopolist when consumers are boundedly rational. All three essays
are united by the question how consumers’ perception of their demand affects their choice
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of complex pricing schemes.
In both experiments, subjects need to choose from a set of complex pricing schemes.
Three main motives guide me to collect lab data for studying such choices instead of using
field data that could range from saving plans to packages of different sizes in supermarkets.
First, I want to be able to control the consumers’ demand and their perception of it.
Second, I want to see how consumers process the information on available pricing schemes.
Third, I need enough variation in the parameters of pricing schemes to have different
predictions from different decision rules. Below, I show which features of the experimental
design bring me closer to satisfying these requirements.
Different approaches are used to control for the consumers’ demand and their percep-
tion of it in the two experiments reported in this dissertation. In the experiment reported
in Chapter 1, a consumption task is used for that, where subjects are offered a sequence
of consumption units with specified benefits and costs. They are expected to consume
those units whose benefits are higher than costs and to ignore those units whose benefits
are lower than costs. After the consumption task is over, they are asked a sequence of
questions that reveal their understanding of their demand. In the experiment reported
in Chapter 2, subjects are given a specific demand range and are told that their payoff
will be determined using several random independent realizations from this range.
To know how subjects process the information on prices, I use the Mouselab Web tool.2
With this tool, all parameters of pricing schemes in both experiments are presented in a
table format. Cells of the table are covered such that a subject has to click on the cell to
see the corresponding parameter. He can see only one parameter at a given time. Every
click is recorded by the program. This enables me to identify the sequence in which the
information is acquired and to measure the time spent on observing each parameter.
Approaches used in the two experiments to enable the comparison of different decision
rules also vary. In the experiment documented in Chapter 1, different sets of pricing
schemes are offered to subjects from different treatments and, hence, predictions of the
considered decision rules vary across treatments. Subjects need to choose a pricing scheme
only once. In the experiment documented in Chapter 2, subjects are asked to make a
choice 27-30 times, each time facing a different set of pricing schemes. Here predictions
of the considered decision rules differ across tasks but are the same for all subjects.
The main experimental result presented in this dissertation comes from the second ex-
periment. In that experiment, subjects are offered four three-part tariffs, where the three
2The tool can be downloaded from its homepage: http://mouselabweb.org/.
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parts are a fixed fee, a bundle of included units, and an extra-unit price. Their expected
demand is always equal to the number of included units under one of the three-part tar-
iffs. This tariff is, by the design, the best choice in only one-third of all experimental
tasks, but it is chosen by subjects in 42.3% of the cases, hence revealing a systematic
deviation from the expected-payoff-maximizing behavior.
I propose several explanations for this observation. The leading one is the "expected
demand" heuristic. It assumes that when choosing from a set of three-part tariffs, in-
stead of averaging consumption cost over a possible demand range, consumers take their
expected demand and compute the corresponding cost under each tariff. Then, instead
of taking the tariff with the lowest expected cost, they take the tariff with the lowest cost
of the expected demand. When the cost function is convex at the possible demand range,
and only then, the cost of the expected demand is lower than the expected cost. In the
reported experiment, this is only the case for the tariff with the number of included units
equal to the expected demand, and hence, the "expected demand" heuristic predicts a
bias towards this tariff.
Another relevant explanation of the observed bias towards the tariff with the number
of included units equal to the expected demand is a simple "match" heuristic. Use of the
"match heuristics" assumes that subjects, instead of comparing how much they would pay
under each tariff, simply choose the tariff whose immediately observable characteristic,
which is the number of included units, "matches" their expected demand. This heuristic
predicts that the tariff with the number of included units equal to the expected demand
should be chosen regardless of other parameters of the offered tariffs, which make it
different from the "expected demand" heuristic where other parameters matter. Notably,
this naive decision rule is the best in explaining the choices of 25.5% of the subjects.
The analysis of process data allows me to make another important observation. Sub-
jects are more likely to choose the alternative that they considered first. In addition,
they are more likely to consider the "matched" three-part tariff first when the number
of included units is reflected in the names of the offered tariffs and hence is immediately
observable. This suggests that firms can nudge consumers with different demands to-
wards the choice of different tariffs. This suggestion from the data analysis in Chapter 2
connects it with Chapter 3.
In Chapter 3, I study optimal pricing strategies of a profit-maximizing monopolist
when consumers are boundedly rational and differ in their willingness to pay for the
good. The consumers’ bounded rationality is represented by their limited capacity to
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compare available market offers. From all offers, they only compare offers from a specific
sub-set. From the compared sub-set, they always choose the best one. This consumer
behavior opens up a possibility for the monopolist to move from the second-best towards
the first-best outcome in non-linear pricing. The monopolist can do so by offering the
first-best tariffs together with tariffs that violate the participation constraints of all types
of consumers but manage to distract the consumers’ attention from better tariffs.
The necessary condition for the proposed pricing strategy to work is that consumers
with differing willingness to pay also have different probabilities of comparing particular
sub-sets of available tariffs. Particularly, consumers with a higher willingness to pay
should be more likely to have a tariff that violates everyone’s participation constraint in
their consideration set. The possibility that this happens is supported by the experimental
evidence documented in Chapter 2.
This dissertation broadly contributes to the literature on consumer and producer
problems. In the experimental studies, I propose a design that enables researchers to
gain a deeper understanding of consumer choices. The main result of the presented ex-
perimental studies is that a big portion of choice mistakes can be explained by simplified
computation methods that economic agents use. This result is of a high importance, as
such decision rules can be formally represented and implemented in the producer prob-
lem. In the theoretical study, I show that simple decision rules used by consumers may
substantially affect the optimal pricing strategies of the profit-maximizing monopolist.
The proposed decision rules are far less general than the expected utility maximization
model. Nevertheless, they are applicable to a wide class of choice environments with
complex choice alternatives.
0.1 Related Literature
The focus of this dissertation is on the choice of complex pricing schemes, three-part
tariffs being the leading example. In the first two experimental studies, I explore how the
consumers’ choice of three-part tariffs can be manipulated. In the third theoretical paper,
I find conditions that allow a monopolist to gain higher profits than the standard price
discrimination predicts and relate these conditions to the findings of the experimental
papers. Even though the choice of three-part tariffs is a very specific setting, I wish the
dissertation to be viewed more broadly. Particularly, I want to stress that this choice
should be treated as a search due to high cognitive costs that are involved. However,
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in this case, the search is not alternative-based as consumers can easily observe the
parameters of the offered alternatives and infer their values from those.
Literature from several areas needs to be discussed here. First, this will be the behav-
ioral industrial organization literature that studies how profit-maximizing firms exploit
deviations from rationality in consumer behavior. Then, it will be empirical literature
that uses field data to report certain deviations in consumer behavior. I will then men-
tion experimental studies that look at the errors in individual decision-making and a few
attempts to model consumer behavior in a way that would explain the observed errors.
The existing behavioral IO literature has been reviewed in Ellison 2006 and, more
recently, in Spiegler 2011.3 This dissertation focuses on a monopolist’s pricing strategies
when consumers cannot process all available information. Previously, the consumers’
inability to process information adequately has been studied mostly in the context of
competitive markets. One example is Spiegler 2006, where consumers apply anecdote-
based reasoning. Instead of treating their utility from dealing with a particular firm as
random, which is the case, consumers acquire information on other consumers’ experi-
ences with each firm and believe that their own experience would be the same. Such
behavior promotes the existence of markets where firms do not provide any additional
value compared to the outside option.
Another relevant example comes from Gabaix and Laibson 2006. They study add-on
pricing in the presence of myopic consumers, who choose among firms without taking into
account that to enjoy consumption of the base good they would need to purchase add-ons
in the future. This creates incentives for firms to hide the information on add-on prices,
and even competitive forces cannot always solve this inefficiency. Hence, the presence of
myopic consumers becomes an alternative explanation to information suppression, which
can be also attributed to consumers’ search costs as in Ellison 2005.
The two examples described above deliver a similar idea that when consumers are
boundedly rational, competitive forces are incapable of solving the resulting market inef-
ficiencies. In this dissertation, a different point is stressed. While the competitive market
3Within the rational framework, these were search cost models (Stigler 1961 being one of the most
famous), where the approach lately pursued in the behavioral IO literature was first introduced. The
approach is to formalize the consumers’ deviations from fully rational behavior, e.g. by using the idea
of search costs and to study their implications for market outcomes. Mostly, these deviations were fit
into the optimizing consumer behavior. The study of Smallwood and Conlisk 1979 is worth noting in
this regard as their consumers rely on the market shares of different brands instead of updating beliefs
about the quality of those brands. Ellison and Fudenberg 1995 develop a further market implication of
this type of consumer behavior.
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is originally socially optimal, the monopoly is associated with market inefficiencies. The
presence of boundedly rational consumers in competitive markets produces inefficiencies,
while their presence in a monopoly market creates incentives for the monopolist to capture
more consumer surplus by making socially optimal offers.
A similar point has been previously raised in Della Vigna and Malmendier 2004, Eliaz
and Spiegler 2006, Eliaz and Spiegler 2008, Esteban, Miyagawa, and Shum 2007, Esteban
and Miyagawa 2011, Grubb 2009, and some others. These papers look at the monopolist’s
interactions with consumers whose behavior does not satisfy standard rationality assump-
tions and describe contract design that allows the monopolist to extract a higher share
of consumer surplus. The specific deviations from rationality considered in these papers
are the consumers’ dynamic inconsistency and biased beliefs about future demand.4
As an example, in Grubb 2009, consumers are overconfident about the precision of
their demand estimates. Instead of anticipating correctly that their demand will be in
the range from a to b, consumers believe that it will always be in the middle. The
firms’ attempts to extract a higher share of consumer surplus in this case seem to be the
most compelling explanation for the presence of three-part tariffs. When the demand
realization is at the lower part of the range, consumers overpay due to the presence of
a fixed fee. In the reverse case, they overpay due to steep over-usage charges. As these
cases are not taken into account by consumers when they choose a three-part tariff, firms
benefit by setting high penalties for deviating from the middle of the range.
As a contribution to behavioral IO literature, Chapter 3 of this dissertation focuses
on the consumers’ ability to process easily available information on prices assuming that
they perfectly anticipate their future demand. This appears to be another chance for the
monopolist to extract a higher share of the consumer surplus. He does so by offering pric-
ing schemes that violate standard participation and incentive compatibility constraints.
This pricing strategy has a positive effect on the monopolist’s profit only when specific
conditions derived in Chapter 3 are satisfied.
The discussed theoretical work has mostly been based on the observed patterns of
prices charged in different types of markets. The common understanding of these patterns
is that firms intend to confuse, or obfuscate, consumers and to exploit their not fully
4Dynamically inconsistent preferences have been explored, among others, in Della Vigna and Mal-
mendier 2004, where the authors explicitly rely on a quasi-hyperbolic discount function and compare the
pricing of "leisure" and "investment" goods, and in Eliaz and Spiegler 2006, where the authors present
price discrimination as a monopolist’s screening of the consumers’ degree of sophistication. Heidhues
and Koszegi 2008 explore implications of the consumers’ loss aversion.
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rational preferences. This understanding is also supported by the empirical evidence
of choice mistakes that consumers make. Such evidence comes from the consumers’
choices of health club contracts (DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006), of local telephone
tariffs (Miravete 2003), of mobile phone plans (Grubb 2009), of tariffs for internet access
(Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera 2007), of credit cards (Stango and Zinman 2009), and even
of different-sized packages of light beer (Gu and Yang 2010).
As an example, the main finding in DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006, who use data
on the individual choices of health club contracts and subsequent attendance, is that
consumers who choose monthly or annual contracts pay, on average, $7 per visit more
than they would have paid with a 10-visit pass. The leading explanation proposed by
the authors is the consumers’ overconfidence in their high attendance rate. The authors
discuss other possible explanations, one of them being the consumers’ willingness to
commit to at least some exercising. Implicitly, this means that even though consumers
anticipate a low attendance with a gym contract, they know that without any contract,
their attendance will be even lower. Their net utility from buying a contract, equal to
the utility from gym attendance, which is higher with the contract than without, minus
its cost, might be still higher with the contract than without.
DellaVigna and Malmendier 2006 decline the latter as it seems to be inconsistent with
another result showing that many consumers refrain from renewing their contracts after
the contracts expire, in case they are not renewed automatically. There might be many
motives not to renew the contract that do not contradict the consumers’ sophistication
about their attendance rate. One possibility might be that consumers achieved their
goals even with those few exercises they did and do not have a desire to exercise any
longer. My point here is that without knowing what consumers think their consumption
would be with and without a particular contract, it is hard to discriminate among the
potential explanations of consumers’ choice mistakes. This provides the motivation to
study consumer decisions using controlled economic experiments.
One of the first experimental studies that explore the consumers’ choice of pricing
schemes is a report on the impact of price frames (Huck and Wallace 2010) prepared
for the Office of Fair Trading. The authors compare the subjects’ search and purchase
behavior under several price frames with a baseline treatment being flat per-unit prices.
The price frames considered in the experiment are drip pricing (price increments, e.g.
taxes, are dripped through the buying process); sales (with pre-sale prices given as a
reference to subjects); complex pricing (e.g. "3 for the price of 2"); baiting (when only
8
a limited number of goods is available at the promoted price); and time limited offers.
The authors find that all of these price frames distort consumer decisions in how much
to search and how much to buy and result in overall welfare losses.
Being an excellent start in studying the consumers’ choice of complex pricing schemes
using laboratory experiments, Huck and Wallace 2010 do not yet address how the con-
sumers’ perception of their own demand affects the search process and outcome, partic-
ularly, whether consumers may use this perception and easily observable parameters of
pricing schemes to structure the choice process. Other experimental studies, though, look
at the so-called anchoring effect. The idea of an "anchoring and adjustment" heuristic
originates from the work of Kahneman and Tversky in the 1970s. Tversky 1972 suggests
that a decision maker first observes the parameters of the available alternatives, then
eliminates some of the alternatives relying on easy-to-implement criteria and only then
evaluates the remaining ones.5 When the search is treated this way, the consumers’ per-
ception of their own demand can be a part of easy-to-implement criteria that they use to
sort away certain alternatives.
A typical approach used to explore anchoring effects in economic experiments is to
ask subjects for an irrelevant number, e.g. the last two digits of their ID, and then to
elicit their willingness to pay for specified and displayed goods. Simonson and Drolet
2004 report that subjects with the IDs whose last two digits make for a larger number
are willing to pay a higher price for a bottle of wine.
Most existing experimental studies of individual decision making (as opposed to games
and markets) use the choice from a set of gambles as an environment. The experimental
evidence collected in such an environment gave rise to a number of alternative theories
of decision making. With a few exceptions (see Hey, Lotito, and Maffioletti 2008), these
theories are generalizations of the expected utility theory. Namely, they explain certain
deviations from supposedly optimal behavior by modifying the decision makers’ objective
function.6 The major objection to extending expected utility theory (see Gigerenzer,
Todd, and the ABC Research Group 1999) is that adding more parameters into the
model improves its fitting ability (so that the collected data will be explained) but not its
predictive power (so that it is not guaranteed that new data will be predicted correctly).
5More generally, Tversky and Kahneman 1974 propose that when choosing from a set of complex
alternatives, decision makers rely on heuristics instead of computing and comparing the values of each
alternative.
6For a comprehensive summary of emergent theories and an investigation of their potential superiority
over the expected utility theory, see Hey and Orme 1994. The authors show that such superiority is, in
fact, questionable.
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As an alternative approach to understanding individual decision-making, the ABC
research group has developed the idea of simple heuristics (Gigerenzer et al. 1999). They
claim that, when dealing with choice problems, rather than maximizing any objective
function, people use simple comparison rules. For example, Brandstatter, Gigerenzer,
and Hertwig 2006 introduce the priority heuristic that allows for a making of risky choices
without trade-offs. This heuristic is capable of predicting the majority of biases observed
in the experiments, where subjects need to choose between lotteries. However, it is
impossible to distinguish whether subjects use heuristics or maximize some odd objective
functions when only information on their actual choices is available. Then, process data
becomes important.
As Johnson, Schulte-Mecklenbeck, andWillemsen 2008 propose, process models should
be tested using process data. This data can be collected with a tool like Mouselab, which
was previously adopted in Johnson, Camerer, Sen, and Rymon 2002 to demonstrate
that the subjects deviate from backward induction in sequential bargaining games, and
in Gabaix, Laibson, Moloche, and Weinberg 2006 to show that the directed cognition
model predicts the sequence of steps in the information acquisition process better than
the fully rational model. An alternative process tracking tool, iView, that records eye
movements, has been used in Rubinstein, Arieli, and Ben-Ami 2010 to conclude that
decision-makers are more likely to compare prizes and their probabilities separately when
choosing between lotteries. In the experimental studies reported in this dissertation, I
use the Mouselab tool to collect data on the process of choosing three-part tariffs by
consumers and to test whether this process can be treated as search.
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Chapter 1
Choosing a Three-Part Tariff in a Lab
Standard price discrimination theories are based on the assumption that consumers use
their demand estimates to evaluate their net utility from each available payment scheme.
Unless they make errors in estimating their demand or evaluating their net utility, con-
sumers always choose the payment scheme with the highest net utility. In this Chapter
of the dissertation, I present a laboratory experiment designed to measure how good
consumers are in estimating their demand and in evaluating their net utility from offered
three-part tariffs and to study how these abilities affect their choice of a three-part tariff.
One important result is that subjects need guidance on how to evaluate their net utility
in order to do it properly. The second result is that only conditional on making optimal
consumption decisions prior to the choice of a three-part tariff can subjects use feedback
on such decisions to find the three-part tariff that is the best for their demand type. Both
results rely on the process data collected from the experiment using the Mouselab Web.
JEL classification: D42, D83
Keywords: choice process, heuristics, price discrimination, three-part tariffs, experiment
0I am grateful to Andreas Ortmann for supervising the project and to Katarina Kalovcova for her
help with conducting the experiment. I also thank Peter Katuscak, Avner Shaked, Fabio Michelucci,
Levent Celik, Libor Dusek and participants of the CERGE-EI experimental luncheon group for useful
comments and conversations. This research was supported by GDN grant No. RRC IX-43. All opinions
expressed are those of the author and have not been endorsed by the GDN. All errors remaining in this
text are the responsibility of the author.
11
1.1 Introduction
In many markets, consumers need to choose from a set of complex payment schemes in
order to consume a homogeneous good. This appears to be a complicated task, and there
is no clear understanding on how consumers undertake it. The standard price discrim-
ination literature implicitly assumes that consumers can always find the best payment
scheme by computing and then comparing their expected utility under each available
alternative. Given that the choice of payment schemes requires computations that are
cognitively costly, the existing search models can be applied to understand it better. The
alternative-based search models suggest that consumers will keep searching as long as
they believe that they can find a scheme that is sufficiently better than the best from
those considered up to the moment. When the best available alternative is not even
considered during the search process, such models give an easy explanation why it is not
chosen. Still, the alternative-based search models where getting an alternative considered
at the early stage of the search process is costless imply that from the set of considered
alternatives the best should be always chosen.
Two elements of the described consumer problem are addressed in this paper. First,
in the case of complex payment schemes, it largely depends on the consumer’s demand
which scheme is the best for the consumer. As an example, a scheme with a high bundle
of endowed monthly consumption and, consequently, a high monthly fee might be the
best option for a consumer with high demand, but not for a consumer who needs little.
Assume that the demand is deterministic, and the consumer is not new to the market
when he chooses the payment scheme. That is, he can learn his demand from his past
experience and use this information to make the optimal choice. The first question posed
in this paper is whether consumers do it, and how their ability to do it affects their choice.
Second, in most cases, relevant parameters of all complex payment schemes are imme-
diately available, that is, a consumer does not need to walk from one store to another to
learn them. What he needs to do is to process these easily available parameters to infer
his utility from each payment scheme. The second question addressed in this paper is
whether consumers evaluate payment schemes in such a manner, or whether they apply
alternative decision rules, and how this affects their choice of a payment scheme.
Both questions are studied using data from a computer-based laboratory experiment,
where a standard consumer problem of choosing a three-part tariff is replicated. The
experiment consists of three tasks. In the first and the third tasks, subjects need to make
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a sequence of consumption decisions. For each consumption unit offered to them, they
need to decide whether to consume it based on the comparison of its value and cost. The
sequence of units offered to subjects is the same in both tasks. The difference between
tasks is that in the first task, the cost is equal to a fixed per-unit price, while in the
third task, the cost is determined by the three-part tariff chosen in the second task. Prior
to the experiment, subjects are told about its structure and can infer that learning the
sequence of offered consumption units in the first task might be helpful for choosing the
optimal tariff in the second task. The subjects’ earnings from the first task are observable
during the choice of a three-part tariff in the second task, and the experiment is designed
such that the sequence of offered units can be inferred from this number, conditional on
that the optimal consumption decisions have been made. One of the main experimental
results is that those subjects whose consumption decisions in the first task are optimal
are more likely to choose the optimal three-part tariff in the second task if they spend
more time looking at their earnings from the first task. The same does not hold for those
subjects who made more than average sub-optimal decisions in the first task.
The time that subjects spend on looking at one parameter or another is a part of
the process data collected in the experiment using a mouse tracking tool, the Mouselab
Web. Another part of these data is the sequence in which subjects acquire information
on the offered pricing scheme. This sequence allows me to measure what share of each
subject’s mouse movements can be attributed to evaluating the offered three-part tariffs
one-by-one as opposed to comparing them parameter-by-parameter. The data analysis
shows that the type of mouse movements is an important determinant of the choice that
a subject makes in the second task.
Knowing how consumers choose payment schemes is of interest to regulatory author-
ities focused on consumer protection. The European Commission’s proposal to review
the telecom regulatory framework is one example. As a part of the proposed reform,
providers of telecom services should be "obliged to publish information on prices so that
consumers can more easily compare the different offers on the market." 1 The proposal
does not specify what it means for different offers to be more easily comparable.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, the consumer problem is formally
introduced. In Section 1.3, the experimental design is explained. Section 1.4 contains
data analysis and the main results. Concluding remarks are in Section 1.5.
1The proposed reform and reports can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/index_en.htm.
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1.2 Consumer Problem
1.2.1 Consumer Problem and Optimal Behavior
In the experimental study reported here, a consumer is assigned three tasks. First, he
makes a sequence of consumption decisions. At each moment of time, he is offered a
consumption unit with a specified value and cost and is asked whether he wants to take
this unit. The deterministic value of a particular unit is either high, vA, or low, vB.2 The
deterministic cost of all units is the same and is equal to the fixed per-unit price, P0.
In Task 2, the consumer has to choose one out of two available three-part tariffs
knowing that his choice will determine the cost of consumption in Task 3. The three
parts of each tariff are a fixed fee, Fj, to be paid at the beginning of the third task, a
bundle of included units, Ij, provided without any additional charge after the fixed fee is
paid, and an extra-unit price, Pj, to be paid for each unit consumed in addition to the
included units, where j = 1, 2 refers to the tariff.3
In Task 3, the consumer again needs to make a sequence of consumption decisions.
The consumption units have the same values and are offered in the same order as in
Task 1; however, the cost of consumption is now determined by the three-part tariff
chosen in Task 2.
The idea behind the three tasks introduced above is to imitate a real-life consumer
problem in a laboratory setting. When a consumer first enrolls in some service, e.g.
mobile phone calling in a new country, in most cases he chooses a flat per-unit price to
learn better about his consumption patterns. Once he knows how his consumption looks
like, he may choose a more complex tariff plan. Then he continues consuming the service
under a new cost function. Consumption units with high and low values can be treated
as important and not so important calls.
For the rational consumer, the predicted behavior in each task is the following:
Task 1: Consumption under a flat per-unit price. As the consumption cost is
determined by a flat per-unit price, consumption of a particular unit does not affect the
2Despite all the insights into categorical reasoning that we have (see Laurence and Margolis 1999,
Murphy 2004 for overviews, and Mohlin 2009 for an attempt to model categorical reasoning), categoriza-
tion of consumption units is generally not allowed in theoretical literature. This prevents the demand
function from being discontinuous. In the experiment, there is no need in a continuous demand func-
tion. I intentionally impose the categorization of consumption units. It makes it easier for consumers to
remember their consumption patterns.
3Plans are numbered such that F2 > F1. This paper focuses on the case when this implies that I2 > I1
and P2 < P1 as is common for mobile phone plans.
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cost of subsequent units. In this case, the rational consumer should take all units with a
non-negative net value, and only such units. That is, all vA-units should be consumed if
and only if vA ≥ P0, and all vB-units should be consumed if and only if vB ≥ P0.
Task 2: Choice of a three-part tariff. As the consumer knows that in Task 3 he
will face the same sequence of consumption decisions as in Task 1, he should be able to
infer his optimal consumption under each available three-part tariff when choosing a tariff.
Generally, the optimal consumption under different tariffs is different. Knowing this, the
consumer should be able to compute the net values of his consumption under both tariffs.
Let A∗ij be the optimal consumption of vA-units and B∗ij be the optimal consumption of
vB-units under the tariff j for the consumer i. Then, the net consumption value of the
tariff j for the consumer i is equal to vA ∗A∗ij +vB ∗B∗ij−Fj−Pj ∗max{0, A∗ij +B∗ij− Ij}.
Optimally, the tariff with the highest net consumption value should be chosen.
Task 3: Consumption under the chosen three-part tariff. When the consump-
tion cost is determined by a three-part tariff, the marginal cost of a particular unit is
either zero if the accumulated consumption is below the number of included units, or
equal to the extra-unit price if the accumulated consumption has already reached the
number of included units. Hence, the consumer has to decide a priori which units and
how many of them to consume in Task 3. This decision should be based on the knowledge
of the total number of vA- and vB-units that will be offered, Āi and B̄i correspondingly,
and on the parameters of the tariff j chosen in Task 2.
The first question for the consumer to answer is whether taking all vA-units is optimal.
The answer is affirmative, i.e. A∗ij = Āi, if the total number of such units does not exceed
the number of included units. Otherwise, the answer is still affirmative, i.e. A∗ij = Āi, if
vA ≥ Pj, or the optimal consumption of vA-units is equal to the number of included units,
A∗ij = Ij, if vA < Pj. The next question to answer concerns the optimal consumption of
vB-units. To answer this question, the consumer should go through the same procedure
as just described, but take into account the difference between the number of included
units and the optimal number of vA-units, Ij−A∗ij, instead of just the number of included
units. If this difference is non-positive, the consumer should take all vB-units if vB ≥ Pi,
and none of them otherwise. Formally, the optimal consumption is:
A∗ij =
{
Āi if vA ≥ Pj





B̄i if vB ≥ Pj
min{B̄i,max{Ij − A∗ij, 0}} if vB < Pj
. (1.2)
1.2.2 Possible Deviations from Optimal Behavior
It should be extremely easy for the consumer to behave optimally in Task 1. For every
offered unit, he just needs to compare its value, vA or vB, with its cost, P0. It seems
that no systematic mistakes may occur at this step. However, the consumer may not
remember how many units of each type he has been offered in Task 1, and hence, it
might be difficult if not impossible for him to evaluate the optimal consumption and
the corresponding net consumption value under the tariffs offered in Task 2. The main
question addressed in this paper is how consumers with different abilities to remember
the sequence of offered consumption units deal with the choice of the three-part tariff in
Task 2.
Two possible scenarios are considered. First, consumers who do not remember exactly
how many vA- and vB-units they have been offered in Task 1, may use some estimates of
these numbers to compute the net consumption values of both tariffs offered in Task 2.
Second, they may ignore this information and choose the tariff based on the parameters
of the offered tariffs only. In both cases, many arbitrary assumptions have to be made
to predict which tariff will be chosen. I make an attempt to avoid such assumptions by
introducing specific features of the experimental design described below. Briefly, these
features are the Mouselab Web tool that allows the collecting of process data and a
questionnaire that reveals how well subjects know their consumption patterns.
In this paper, I evaluate only one decision rule that allows the making of a reasonable
choice based solely on the parameters of the offered tariffs. This decision rule was sug-
gested by the participants of the pilot sessions in post-experimental personal interviews.
The decision rule includes the following steps: (1) compute how much it costs to consume
I2 under the first tariff, F1 + P1 ∗ (I2 − I1), (2) take the first tariff if this cost is lower
than F2, and take the second tariff otherwise. This decision rule predicts the same choice
for all subjects facing the same set of three-part tariffs and does not depend on their




To implement the consumer problem introduced in Section 1.2, three corresponding tasks
are given to subjects. Subjects are randomly assigned into two demand types, low (i = L)
or high (i = H), and five treatments. The demand types differ in the total number of
offered vA- and vB-units but not in the value of each unit. In this study, I only consider
the case when a higher demand for vA-units is associated with a higher demand for
vB-units, and I believe that for the question under consideration, that is, how subjects
with a different ability to remember their consumption patterns deal with the choice of a
three-part tariff, this is not a crucial restriction. Two demand types are needed to vary
the importance of remembering the number of vA- and vB-units precisely in making the
optimal choice of a three-part tariff. As it will become clear later, the high-demand type
only needs to remember that he has many enough vA-units, while the low-demand type
needs to have an idea about both lower and upper bounds on the number of vA-units.
Consumption units are offered to subjects sequentially in the way illustrated in Fig. 1.2,
and the sequences are the same for all subjects of the same demand type. At each mo-
ment of time, a subject is offered either a vA-, or a vB-unit, and within a specified time
limit he needs to indicate whether he accepts that unit or not. If he does not indicate
anything, it is treated as no acceptance. The parameters used to define consumption
values are listed in Table 1.1. The unit price charged in Task 1, P0, is the same for all
subjects and is equal to 6 ECU, making the net value of a vA-unit equal to 4 ECU, and
the net value of a vB-unit equal to -3 ECU. Hence, the optimal consumption in Task 1 is
A∗i = Āi and B∗i = 0 for both types. To equalize the time spent on the consumption task
by both types, different time limits are imposed: the low-demand type has 6 seconds to
decide whether he is taking an offered unit, and the high-demand type has 4 seconds for
this. The total duration of the consumption task is 3 minutes for both types.4
After Task 1 is completed but before Task 2 starts, earnings from Task 1 are displayed
on the subject’s computer screen as illustrated in Fig. 1.3. Sophisticated subjects who
optimally consumed all vA-units and only them in Task 1 can use this information to
infer the number of vA-units offered to them. They just need to divide their earnings by
4This design feature is motivated by a real-life analogue of the consumer problem studied here. The
total length of the consumption period is typically the same for all consumers, e.g. one month, but
consumers with high demand need to make consumption decisions more often.
17
the net value of a vA-unit, Āi = Wi/(vA − P0), where Wi is earnings from Task 1.
Table 1.1: Parameters defining consumption values for two demand types.
Parameter Low-demand type High-demand type
vA 10 ECU 10 ECU
vB 3 ECU 3 ECU
Āi 20 units 30 units
B̄i 10 units 15 units
In Task 2, subjects need to choose one three-part tariff from the two offered to them.
The choice is represented to subjects as in Fig. 1.4. It is always the case that Plan 1
is optimal for the low-demand type, and Plan 2 is optimal for the high-demand type.
As subjects do not know about the existence of the two types, they cannot use this
information in choosing a tariff. The five treatments to which subjects are randomly
assigned differ in the parameters of the offered three-part tariffs as shown in Table 1.2.
Differences across treatments allow for the using of a between-subject analysis to under-
stand the incorrect choices of three-part tariffs better. These differences are discussed in
Section 1.3.2.
Table 1.2: The parameters of three-part tariffs offered in Task 2.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2
Fixed Fee 120 ECU 200 ECU 120 ECU 200 ECU 120 ECU 180 ECU
Included Units 20 units 30 units 20 units 30 units 20 units 25 units
Extra Unit Price 11 ECU 5 ECU 9 ECU 5 ECU 11 ECU 4 ECU
Treatment 4 Treatment 5
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2
Fixed Fee 120 ECU 180 ECU 75 ECU 200 ECU
Included Units 20 units 25 units 15 units 30 units
Extra Unit Price 9 ECU 4 ECU 9 ECU 5 ECU
Those subjects who did not manage to learn their consumption patterns in Task 1
might be subjectively uncertain about Āi and B̄i. Such subjects might be risk-averse
and hence biased towards Plan 2 that has a lower variation in possible consumption
cost. To minimize the role of risk aversion and other possible consequences of subjective
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uncertainty, subjects are paid a bonus of 20 ECU for choosing the tariff that maximizes
their consumption value. Task 2 has a time limit of 15 minutes.
After the tariff is chosen, Task 3 starts. The same sequence of units as in Task 1
is offered to subjects. The consumption values are also the same, but the cost is now
determined by the tariff chosen in Task 2. This choice affects the optimal consumption
decisions in Task 3. If the optimal tariff is chosen, i.e. Plan 1 by the low-demand type and
Plan 2 by the high-demand type, then the optimal consumption is the same as in Task 1,
i.e. A∗i = Āi and B∗i = 0 for both types. If a choice error is made in Task 2, then the
optimal consumption in Task 3 depends on the treatment. For the low-demand type, in
addition to A∗L = 20, it becomes optimal to consume B∗L = 10 in Treatments 1, 2, and 5,
and B∗L = 5 in Treatments 3 and 4. For the high-demand type, always consuming B∗H = 0,
it becomes optimal to reduce the consumption of vA-units to A∗H = 20 in Treatments 1
and 3, while consuming A∗H = 30 in Treatments 2, 4, and 5.
Under the chosen parameters of the consumer problem studied in this paper, the
optimal behavior leads to the following predictions:
H0-1: In Task 1, all subjects of the low-demand type consume 20 vA-units and no
vB-units, and all subjects of the high-demand type consume 30 vA-units and no vB-units.
H0-2: In Task 2, all subjects of the low-demand type choose Plan 1, and all subjects
of the high-demand type choose Plan 2.
H0-3: In Task 3, conditional on the optimal choice of a three-part tariff in Task 2, all
subjects of the low-demand type consume 20 vA-units and no vB-units, and all subjects of
the high-demand type consume 30 vA-units and no vB-units.
1.3.2 Variations across Treatments
The variations in the parameters of three-part tariffs across the five experimental treat-
ments presented in Table 1.2 should be treated as minor. In all treatments, it is optimal
for the low-demand type to choose Plan 1 and for the high-demand type to choose Plan 2.
If they make this choice optimally, then they should consume A∗i = Āi and B∗i = 0 in
Task 3. The corresponding payoffs are 80 ECU and 100 ECU (not counting for the bonus
of 20 ECU for the correct choice in Task 2).
The cost of a choice error in Task 2 and the subsequent optimal consumption in Task 3
slightly vary across treatments. This is reflected in Table 1.3. As it follows immediately,
the cost of a choice error for the low-demand type is 50 ECU in Treatments 1, 2, and 5
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and 45 ECU in Treatments 3 and 4. The cost of a choice error for the high-demand type
is 20 ECU in Treatments 1 and 3 and 10 ECU in Treatments 2, 4, and 5.
Table 1.3: Optimal consumption and the corresponding payoff in Task 3 depending on
the tariff choice in Task 2 and the treatment.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Treatment 5
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2
Low-demand type
A∗L 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20
B∗L 0 10 0 10 0 5 0 5 0 10
payoff 80 30 80 30 80 35 80 35 80 30
High-demand type
A∗H 20 30 30 30 20 30 30 30 30 30
B∗H 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
payoff 80 100 90 100 80 100 90 100 90 100
One potential reason for a choice error in Task 2 is that the difference in the subsequent
payoffs is too small for subjects to notice it. This leads to the following testable hypothesis
(the null-hypothesis being that subjects make no choice errors):
HA-1: Other things being equal, a choice error is more likely when its cost is smaller.
Practically, this hypothesis implies three things. First, subjects of the high-demand
type are expected to make more choice errors than subjects of the low-demand type.
Second, subjects of the low-demand type are expected to make more choice errors in
Treatments 3 and 4. Third, subjects of the high-demand type are expected to make more
choice errors in Treatments 2, 4, and 5.
Another potential reason for a choice error in Task 2 is suggested by the participants
of the pilot sessions, as described at the end of Section 1.2. This reason is that a subject
relies on a decision rule that does not take into account his demand type. Particularly,
the tariff choice is based only on the consumption cost of the included bundle of Plan 2.
This cost is simply F2 under Plan 2, and it is equal to F1 + P1 ∗ (I2 − I1) under Plan 1.
These costs and predicted choices for all treatments are presented in Table 1.4.
To evaluate how likely this decision rule is to explain the subjects’ behavior, the
following alternative hypothesis is tested:
HA-2: Other things being equal, subjects are more likely to choose Plan 1 when
F1 + P1 ∗ (I2 − I1) < F2 and more likely to choose Plan 2 when the opposite is true.
Translated into the proportion of expected choice errors, this hypothesis implies that
the low-demand type would be more likely to make a choice error in Treatments 1, 2,
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Table 1.4: Cost of consuming included units of Plan 2 and predicted choice under the
demand-neutral decision rule across treatments.
Treatment 1 Treatment 2 Treatment 3 Treatment 4 Treatment 5
Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2 Plan 1 Plan 2
cost 230 200 210 200 175 180 165 180 210 200
choice x x x x x
and 5, and the high-demand type would be more likely to make a choice error in Treat-
ments 3 and 4. Interestingly, for the low-demand type this is exactly the opposite to
what the previous hypothesis implies.
The discussion above summarizes how variations across treatments can be used in
between-subject analysis to infer what reasons cause potential errors in the choice of a
three-part tariff. The main idea is that when enough variation in the parameters of tariffs
is introduced, different decision rules give different predictions for the difference in error
rates across treatments. As the experiment reported here is one of the first attempting
to replicate a consumer problem of choosing a three-part tariff in a laboratory setting,
its main purpose is to develop a research method rather than to make strong claims
about validity of particular explanations. Hence, I do not introduce more alternative
decision rules that could be potentially tested. Instead, I develop another feature of the
experimental design that can be used for a better understanding of consumer behavior.
This feature is the usage of the Mouselab Web tool described below.
1.3.3 Process Data
As Johnson et al. 2008 propose, a better understanding of the subjects’ decisions can be
achieved by using process data together with outcome data. One way to collect process
data is by using the Mouselab Web tool.5 The three-part tariffs are presented to subjects
in Task 2 as illustrated in Fig. 1.4. Each cell of the table is covered with its label, and
to see its value, a subject needs to point at the corresponding label with his mouse. The
cell remains open as long as the mouse is pointed at it. The Mouselab Web tool records
all mouse transitions between the cells of the table. With this data, a researcher knows
in which sequence each subject acquired the information, as well as how often and for
how long each cell was opened.
5An example of a Mouselab Web table can be found at http://www.mouselabweb.org.
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To use the data collected with the Mouselab Web, one needs to believe that subjects
process information in the same order as they acquire it. Such a belief is supported
by other economists using the Mouselab Web tool.6 However, a so-called reading effect
should be controlled for (see Brandstatter et al. 2006 and Gabaix et al. 2006). The
essence of the reading effect is that subjects tend to move the mouse from left to right
and from up to down without processing the information acquired this way.
Typically, the reading effect is minimized by randomizing the order in which the
information is presented to subjects. I chose not to randomize this order so as to stay
close to a real-life representation of three-part tariffs. Alternatively, Klayman 1983 and
Johnson et al. 2008 separate reading and choice phases of the information acquisition
process. They do so by casting away all the transitions made before important pieces of
information have been examined at least once. In my case, this solution would leave too
few observations for the analysis, hence I propose a different solution to control for the
reading effect.
My solution is based on the assumption that if a subject has a tendency to move the
mouse in a certain direction, this has a permanent effect on his mouse movements. The
idea is to induce subjects to evaluate their payoff separately under each three-part tariff,
and to record how they move the mouse during this process. I call this induced process
the evaluative stage of the tariff choice, as opposed to the natural stage that takes place
when subjects are only asked to choose the tariff that would maximize their payoff in
Task 3. A comparison of the subjects’ mouse movements at the evaluative and natural
stages can suggest what they actually do when making a choice.
To implement the evaluative stage, a questionnaire with the steps needed to compute
the payoff under each pricing scheme follows the table with the offered three-part tariffs
(Fig. 1.5).7 To see the questionnaire, subjects need to scroll down the page in Task 2.
This set-up allows me to assume that subjects see the questionnaire only after they decide
which tariff to choose. I, therefore, use the moment when the questionnaire is addressed
6Previously, the Mouselab Web was used in Costa-Gomes, Crawford, and Broseta 2001, Costa-Gomes
and Crawford 2006, Gabaix et al. 2006, Johnson et al. 2002, Johnson et al. 2008. Costa-Gomes et
al. 2001 and Costa-Gomes and Crawford 2006 illustrate that the distortions in choices caused by the
Mouselab environment, and in particular, the fact that to acquire information a subject needs to move
his mouse, are minimal.
7Answering the posed questions is voluntary. However, subjects are told that this might help in
finding the correct plan. 50 subjects answered all questions, 16 others answered none of them. The
choice error is insignificantly higher among those who answered all questions (36%) compared to those
who answered none (25%). Surprising at first sight, this observation might be interpreted as those who
were confident in their choice being correct had no interest in improving it.
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for the first time as the separation between the natural and the evaluative stages. This
moment is captured by the Mouselab Web tool.
Using the process data separated into the natural and the evaluative stages, I can check
whether subjects tend to make choice errors in Task 2 because they do not evaluate their
payoffs under the offered three-part tariffs properly. For that, I claim that a subject needs
to move the mouse between the scheme’s parameters to evaluate his payoff under this
scheme. These are vertical movements. Counting such movements at the evaluative stage
indicates how many of them, relative to other types of movements, a subject needs to
evaluate his payoff. Comparing the shares of vertical movements at the natural and the
evaluative stages indicates how likely a subject is to evaluate his payoffs under the offered
three-part tariffs when choosing between them. Having this indicator, the following
hypothesis can be tested.
H1-3: Other things being equal, subjects who are more likely to evaluate their earnings
under the offered three-part tariffs are more likely to choose the optimal tariff.
1.3.4 Subjective Demand Uncertainty
At this moment, it is important to come back to the issue of subjective demand uncer-
tainty. Even though subjects are explicitly and a priori told that the sequence of offered
units is the same in Task 1 and Task 3, some of them do not memorize this sequence
in Task 1 and hence are subjectively uncertain about their future consumption when
choosing a three-part tariff in Task 2. They can, in principle, estimate the number of vA-
and vB-units offered to them and use these estimates to evaluate their payoffs under the
offered three-part tariffs.
Estimating the total number of offered vA-units is easier for subjects who make fewer
sub-optimal decisions in Task 1, i.e. consume almost all vA-units and almost none vB-
units. In this case, dividing the payoff from Task 1 by the net value of a vA-unit gives a
good idea about the total number of offered vA-units. Time spent on observing the payoff
from Task 1 can serve as an indicator whether subjects use this approach to estimate the
total number of offered vA-units. Under the implicit assumption that knowing this number
helps in finding the optimal three-part tariff, this leads to the following hypothesis.
H1-4: Other things being equal, subjects with relatively few errors in Task 1 who spend
more time on analyzing their payoff from Task 1 are more likely to choose the optimal
three-part tariff in Task 2.
23
1.3.5 Implementation
Six experimental sessions to collect data were conducted at the CERGE-EI computer lab
with 20 machines in April - June 2009. Subjects were students of Charles University
in Prague recruited through the ORSEE system.8 A total of 96 subjects participated
in the experiment, 61 of them were males and 59 studied either economics or business
administration. Subjects were paid in CZK.9 The average earnings were 525 CZK in
Sessions 1-2, 385 CZK in Sessions 3-4, and 560 CZK in Sessions 5-6.10
A page with general information about the experiment (see Fig. 1.1) was opened at
each computer screen before subjects entered the lab. This part of the instructions was
read aloud. Importantly, subjects were told at the very beginning, and it was repeated
later on, that they would have to complete two identical consumption tasks with the only
difference being that in the later task, their consumption costs would be determined by
their own choice of a three-part tariff. From this statement, they could infer that remem-
bering the sequence of consumption units offered in Task 1 might be useful. Subjects
were assured that everyone could earn the same amount and that their earnings would
depend on their own performance but not on the performance of others.11
Afterwards, subjects proceeded at their individual pace and read the detailed instruc-
tions themselves. Particularly, they learned the exchange rate between ECU and CZK
privately, as this rate was different for subjects of the low- and high-demand types. The
exchange rates were 2 CZK to 1 ECU for the low-demand type and 1.5 CZK to 1 ECU
for the high-demand type in Sessions 1-4 and 3.2 CZK to 1 ECU for the low-demand
type and 2.4 CZK to 1 ECU for the high-demand type in Sessions 5-6. The maximum
possible payoffs from the experimental tasks were 360 CZK in Sessions 1-4 and 580 CZK
in Sessions 5-6. Due to various possibilities of additional earnings, the maximum possible
overall payoffs were 610 CZK in Sessions 1-2, 460 CZK in Sessions 3-4, and 680 CZK in
Sessions 5-6.12
Before the detailed instructions were displayed, subjects were asked to complete a
8Subjects could register at http://www.experimenty.eu/public/.
9The exchange rate was 1 CZK for approximately 0.05 USD at the time of the experiment.
10See below why and how the maximum possible earnings varied across these sessions.
11The maximum possible earnings varied across sessions though as the value of subjects’ time was
potentially higher in the later sessions conducted during the exam period.
12In addition to the performance-based payoff, the subjects received 50 CZK for completing a person-
ality quiz prior to the experiment. Also, they received 50 CZK for answering a set of questions at the end
of the experiment in Sessions 3-6 and on average 210 CZK for participating in an additional experiment
that took about 30 min in Sessions 1-2.
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personality quiz. After subjects read the detailed instructions, they were asked to fill in
missing values in two practice examples. To make sure that the instructions were under-
stood correctly, it was not possible to proceed until correct answers were submitted.13
After the experiment was over, each subject was asked to fill in a final questionnaire and
was paid afterwards. The experiment, including reading the instructions and filling in
the questionnaires, took, on average, about one hour.
1.4 Results
Of the 96 subjects that participated in the experiment, 32 made a choice error in Task 2.
This clearly rejects hypothesis H0-2 of no choice errors in Task 2.14 The distribution of
incorrect choices across demand types and treatments is shown in Table 1.5. Using this
distribution, one can test for the hypotheses formulated in Section 1.3.2.
Table 1.5: The distribution of incorrect choices across demand types and treatments
T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 Total
low high low high low high low high low high low high
# choice errors 4 3 7 3 1 4 1 1 5 2 18 13
# choices 11 9 16 15 10 10 4 5 8 8 49 47
Total: 20 Total: 31 Total: 20 Total: 9 Total: 16 Total: 96
The hypotheses testing relies on the Fisher’s Exact Test. To test hypothesis HA-
1, the error rates between the low-demand type (high cost) and the high-demand type
(low cost), between the low-demand type in Treatments 1, 2, and 5 (high cost) and in
Treatments 3 and 4 (low cost), and between the high-demand type in Treatments 1 and 3
(high cost) and in Treatments 2, 4, and 5 (low-cost) are compared. The comparison is
shown in Table 1.6. In each test, the null-hypothesis is that there is no variation in the
error rate across the groups. This is tested against a one-sided alternative that the error
rate is higher for the groups with a lower cost of making a choice error. From these three
tests it follows that a higher cost of a choice error does not reduce its probability.
13Contact the author for the complete set of instructions and practice examples.
14In Task 1, the average share of not taken vA-units is 9.9%, and the average share of taken vB-units
is 13.9%, which rejects hypothesis H0-1 of optimal behavior in Task 1. For those subjects who choose
the optimal three-part tariff in Task 2, the average share of not taken vA-units is 4.9%, and the average
share of taken vB-units is 12.6% in Task 3. This is lower than the error rate of the same subjects in
Task 1 but still not low enough not to reject hypothesis H0-3.
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Table 1.6: Fisher’s Exact Tests for the differences in the error rate between groups with
different costs of making a choice error. The p-value listed first is the probability that
the null is true when compared to the alternative that the error rate is higher when its
cost is lower. The p-value listed in parentheses is the probability that the null is true
when compared to the alternative that the error rate is higher when its cost is higher.
All subjects Low-demand type High-demand type
high demand low demand low cost high cost low cost high cost
Choice error 13 18 2 16 6 7
No choice error 34 31 12 19 22 12
1-tail p-values .88 (.23) .99 (.04) .93 (.2)
Result 1: When the cost of a choice error increases, subjects become more prone to
choice errors. The effect is statistically significant for the low-demand subjects.
Under the assumption that choice errors are due to a random noise in the subjects’
evaluation of their payoffs from the offered three-part tariffs, the result just reported is
counterintuitive. One would expect the opposite relation between the cost of a choice error
and its rate if the assumption was true. With the observed pattern, it becomes clear that
a random noise in the subjects’ evaluation of their payoffs is not the strongest determinant
of choice errors. In fact, the result becomes more intuitive when one remembers that for
the low-demand type, the treatments with a higher cost of a choice error were also those
where the demand-neutral decision rule predicts an incorrect choice for them.
This demand-neutral decision rule suggested by the participants of the pilot sessions
is to choose the tariff with the lowest cost of consuming the included bundle of Plan 2.
It predicts that Plan 1 should be chosen in Treatments 3 and 4, and Plan 2 should be
chosen in the remaining treatments. Hence, the error rate of the low-demand type whose
optimal choice is always Plan 1 should be lower in Treatments 3 and 4, and the opposite
should be the case for the high-demand type whose optimal choice is always Plan 2 (see
hypothesis HA-2). The corresponding Fisher’s Exact Tests are presented in Table 1.7.
They partially support the demand-neutral decision rule.
Result 2: The error rate is higher when the demand-neutral decision rule predicts that
a sub-optimal three-part tariff should be chosen. The difference is statistically significant
for the low-demand subjects.
Other decision rules could be considered and evaluated here, but as the paper focuses
more on methodology, I move instead to the analysis of the collected process data. Using
these data, first the method proposed in Section 1.3.3 is used to construct a variable
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Table 1.7: Fisher’s Exact Tests for the validity of the demand-neutral decision rule. The
listed p-value is the probability that the null is true when compared to the alternative
that the demand-neutral decision rule predicts correctly.
Low-demand type High-demand type
predicted high predicted low predicted high predicted low
error rate error rate error rate error rate
Choice error 16 2 5 8
No choice error 19 12 10 24
1-tail p-values .04 .4
that measures how likely a subject is to evaluate his payoff under each tariff separately.
Within this method, the shares of vertical mouse movements (i.e. between the param-
eters of one three-part tariff) at the natural and at the evaluative stages of the tariff
choice are compared. To reduce the noise caused by random mouse movements, only
three consequent mouse movements within the same three-part tariff are considered as
evaluative movements. As it follows from Table 1.8, the share of such evaluative mouse
movements is by 9 p.p. higher at the evaluative stage of the choice process. In the later
analysis, individual differences in the shares of evaluative mouse movements between the
evaluative and the natural stages of the choice process are used. As one can see from
Table 1.8, for more than a quarter of subjects this difference is negative. For subjects
with the negative difference, the average share of evaluative movements is higher at the
natural stage (27% vs. 13.1%) and lower at the evaluative stage (16.5% vs. 29.8%)
than for subjects with the positive difference. It appears that the error rate in Task 2 is
significantly higher for subjects with a negative difference (50%) than for subjects with
a positive difference (26.5%). It is not really clear why this is the case. Potentially, a
positive difference reveals those for whom the questionnaire, i.e. the evaluative stage,
helps them to make a correct choice of a three-part tariff.
Table 1.8: Mouse movements during the choice of a three-part tariff.
Share of evaluative mouse movements Individual difference in shares
Natural stage Evaluative stage between evaluative and natural stages
mean .167 .257 negative 26 subjects
s.e. (.013) (.015) maximum 68 subjects
# observations 91 mean .09
paired t-test -5.16∗∗∗ st. dev. (.167)
∗∗∗1% significance level
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Next, I measure the effect of the subjects’ subjective uncertainty on their choice of
three-part tariffs in Task 2. First, the subjective uncertainty needs to be measured. It
is done by computing the proportions of not taken vA-units and taken vB-units for each
subject. The sum of the two is used as a measure of subjective uncertainty. Its highest
possible value is 2 when no vA-units and all vB-units are taken, and the lowest is 0 when
there are no errors in Task 1. The highest observed value is 1.
As expected, there is a positive correlation between errors in Task 1 and Task 2 (.371).
At the same time, there is a strong negative correlation between errors in Task 1 and the
shares of evaluative mouse movements at both the natural (-.211) and evaluative (-.346)
stages of the choice process. The correlation between errors in Task 1 and the difference
in the shares of evaluative mouse movements at the two stages is weaker (-.142). This
suggests that there might be a non-trivial effect of subjective demand uncertainty caused
by sub-optimal behavior in Task 1 on the choice of a three-part tariff in Task 2. To
illustrate this point, subjects are divided into four groups based on two criteria. The
first criterion is whether the difference in the shares of evaluative mouse movements is
positive, and the second criterion is whether errors in Task 1 are above the average, which
is roughly .25. The average error rate in Task 2 is computed for each group (Table 1.9).
Table 1.9: The error rate in Task 2 by errors in Task 1 and mouse movements in Task 2.
Evaluative mouse movements
at evaluative and natural stages
Errors in Task 1 negative difference positive difference t-test
≤ .25 43.8% 13.3% 2.2∗∗
> .25 60% 52.2% .4
t-test -.78 -3.29∗∗∗
Remember that the average error rate in Task 2 is 33.3%. It follows from Table 1.9
that the error rate in Task 2 is below the average only for those subjects who both
made relatively few errors in Task 1 and made more evaluative mouse movements when
answering the questionnaire than when choosing a three-part tariff naturally.
Before moving to the regression analysis, I introduce another variable that can poten-
tially explain the sub-optimal choice of a three-part tariff. As mentioned above, subjects
can infer the number of vA- and vB-units that will be offered to them in Task 3 from their
earnings in Task 1. The time they spend on looking at their earnings from Task 1 can
be used as an indicator whether they used this information when choosing a three-part
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tariff. They can see the earnings from Task 1 on a separate screen after Task 1 is over,
before Task 2 starts (Fig. 1.3), and in the corresponding cell of the table displayed in
Task 2 (Fig. 1.4). To control for the fact that some subjects generally spend more time
on processing information than others, the share of the time spent on observing earnings
from Task 1 is computed. This share is higher for those who chose the right three-part
tariff (3.6%) than for those who made a choice error (2.6%).
Table 1.10: The error rate in Task 2 by errors in Task 1 and relative time spent on
observing earnings from Task 1.
Share of time spent on observing earnings
Error measure in Task 1 ≤ 3.2% > 3.2% t-test
≤ .25 27% 12% 1.43∗
> .25 57.1% 53.8% .18
t-test -2.34∗∗ -3.03∗∗∗
Supposedly, to infer any useful information from the level of earnings in Task 1, it
is important not to make too many errors in Task 1, as discussed in Section 1.3.4. To
illustrate the joint effect from errors in Task 1 and time spent on observing earnings
from Task 1 on the error rate in Task 2, subjects are again divided into four groups, and
the error rate in Task 2 is computed for each group (Table 1.10). It follows that only
those subjects with less than an average share of sub-optimal decisions in Task 1 can
increase the probability of choosing the optimal three-part tariff by spending more time
on observing their earnings in Task 1.
Based on the observation that choice errors in Task 2 can be explained differently
depending on the subjects’ performance in Task 1 (as it follows from Table 1.9 and
Table 1.10), a regression analysis is done separately for those with the error measure in
Task 1 below and above the average. The results are in Table 1.11.
Results presented in Table 1.11 allow for the testing of the hypotheses from Sec-
tion 1.3.3 and Section 1.3.4. First, hypothesis H1-3 suggests that evaluating earnings
from the offered three-part tariffs helps in choosing the optimal tariff. The experimental
data give indirect evidence for this when we look at the sign of the coefficient on the
share of evaluative mouse movements at the evaluative stage of the choice process.
Result 3: Other things being equal, the subjects who are more likely to evaluate their
earnings under the offered three-part tariffs when they are guided to do so, are less likely
to choose a sub-optimal tariff.
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Table 1.11: Probit for the sub-optimal choice of a three-part tariff.
Sub-optimal choice of a three-part tariff
Error measure in Task 1
Dependent variable ≤ .25 > .25 all subjects
Cost of choice error .0004 .007 .0006
(.003) (.007) (.003)
# attempts in Test 1 -.012 -.423∗∗∗ -.07
(.026) (.134) (.047)
# attempts in Test 2 .008 .122∗ .026
(.024) (.064) (.025)
Share of evaluative movements .587∗ 1.011 .577
at natural stage (.356) (1.113) (.421)
Share of evaluative movements -.651∗ -.797 -.699∗
at evaluative stage (.378) (.932) (.387)
Share of time spent on -5.22∗∗ -.268 -5.693∗∗
observing earnings from Task 1 (2.5) (6.664) (2.548)
Errors in Task 1 - - .393∗∗
- - (.199)
predicted P .151 .517 .261
# observations 60 30 90
∗ - 10% significance level
∗∗ - 5% significance level
∗∗∗ - 1% significance level
Entries are the marginal effects.
Standard errors clustered at the subject level are in parentheses.
However, as the coefficient on the share of evaluative mouse movements at the natural
stage of the choice process reveals, when subjects seem to evaluate their earnings from the
offered three-part tariffs without guidance, they are more likely to choose a sub-optimal
tariff. A potential explanation is that subjects are not used to evaluating three-part
tariffs properly in their regular life.
Second, hypothesis H1-4 suggests that subjects with a relatively low error rate in
Task 1 are more likely to choose the optimal three-part tariff if they spend relatively
more time looking at their earnings from Task 1. This has strong support in the data.
Result 4: Other things being equal, the subjects with lower-than-average error mea-
sure in Task 1 are less likely to choose a sub-optimal tariff if they spend relatively more
time on observing their earnings from Task 1. This time has no significant effect for
subjects with a higher-than-average error measure in Task 1.
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The most compelling explanation for the reported result is that, conditional on making
optimal decisions in Task 1, subjects can infer the number of offered vA-units from their
earnings in Task 1, and this information proves to be helpful in finding the optimal tariff.
1.5 Conclusion
Chapter 1 of this dissertation reports the results of a laboratory experiment designed
to understand the consumers’ choice of three-part tariffs (i.e. payment schemes that
have a fixed fee, a bundle of included units, and an extra-unit price). In the experiment,
subjects need to complete three interrelated tasks. The first and the third tasks attempt to
replicate the consumption of a service like mobile phone calling. There are two categories
of consumption units that subjects face, with either low, or high consumption value, to
imitate important and not important calls that consumers can potentially make. Subjects
have no control over the sequence in which potential consumption units arrive, but they
are to decide whether to consume a particular unit once it arrives.
The sequences of consumption units that subjects are offered in the two consump-
tion tasks are identical. The difference between tasks is the way subjects pay for their
consumption. In the first task, each unit has the same fixed price, while in the third
task the cost is determined by the three-part tariff chosen in the second experimental
task. Subjects are aware of the structure of the game from the beginning, and they can
anticipate that learning the sequence of consumption units offered to them in the first
task might be helpful for the choice of a three-part tariff in the second task. The main
question addressed in the paper is how the observed 33.3% error rate in the choice of a
three-part tariff can be explained.
The main advantage of studying the choice of a three-part tariff, so common in real
life, using a laboratory experiment is the possibility of collecting process data. The tool
that allows us to do this is the Mouselab Web. It records all mouse movements during
the process of acquiring information on the offered three-part tariffs and on the time
spent on a particular task. By using the collected process data, it is possible to create
two important measures. The first measure relies on the fact that to evaluate payoffs
associated with each three-part tariff, a subject needs to focus on the parameters of one
tariff in isolation from the parameters of the other tariff. So, this measure is the share
of mouse movements within one tariff in the total number of mouse movements. The
second measure relies on the fact that, conditional on making optimal decisions in the
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consumption task, the subject can infer the important information on their consumption
patterns from observing the payoff from the consumption task. Hence, the second measure
is the share of time spent on looking at the payoff from the consumption task from the
time spent overall on the choice of a three-part tariff.
The following two results are the most interesting. First, until subjects are provided
guidance on how to evaluate the offered three-part tariffs, it does not help them to find
the optimal tariff if they focus on evaluating tariffs one by one. Second, unless subjects
make an optimal consumption decision, having feedback on those decisions does not help
them to find the optimal tariff. This leads to the corresponding policy implications: First,
providing consumers with monthly bills does not necessarily help them to improve upon
their choice of tariff. Second, suggesting to consumers on how to evaluate existing market
alternatives might be very efficient.
32
1.6 Appendix
Figure 1.1: Screen-shot of the welcome page.
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Figure 1.2: Screen-shot of Task 1. "Action" stands for "unit" here.
Figure 1.3: Screen-shot of Task 1. Displayed wealth.
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Figure 1.4: Screen shot of Task 2; natural stage.




Heuristics That Consumers Use for Evaluating
Costs of Three-Part Tariffs
I use experimental data to understand how consumers choose three-part tariffs, i.e. pric-
ing schemes characterized with a fixed fee, a bundle of included units, and an extra-unit
price, when their demand is perfectly inelastic but uncertain. The consumer problem
replicated in the experiment is specific in a sense that consumers’ expected demand is
always equal to the number of included units under one of the four offered tariffs. As a re-
sult, the cost function of this tariff is always convex over the possible demand range, while
this is not the case for other tariffs. Depending on what heuristic is used in the choice
of a three-part tariff, the cost under such a tariff might be over- or under-estimated by
consumers. The observed bias towards such a tariff suggests that the latter is the case.
In addition, an analysis of the process data collected with the Mouselab tool suggests
that the choice of a three-part tariff can be treated as a search, and that subjects use
parameters of the offered tariffs to infer the associated consumption costs.
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2.1 Introduction
Consumer life is full of choices. Often, consumers face the problem of choosing a multi-
part pricing scheme. Examples include tariffs for utilities and telecoms services, credit
card contracts, saving and insurance plans, and many others, up to packages of different
size in supermarkets. In this paper, I present a laboratory experiment designed to investi-
gate whether consumers make such choices optimally, what factors can explain potential
deviations from optimality, and how the efficiency of consumers’ choices can be improved.
The experiment used in this paper is built upon the example of mobile phone tariffs
actually existing in the Czech Republic. The tariffs from one of the main operators are
presented in Fig.2.1, where omitted prices are the same across tariffs.
Figure 2.1: Example of mobile phone plans in the Czech Republic, 2007, prices in CZK.
To see why this example is interesting, one needs to compute how much it costs to
consume 80 minutes per month, which are free minutes of the tariff T80, with tariffs T30
and T80. For the tariff T30, assume that 50% of calls are within the network, and 50%
of calls are to other networks. Then 80 minutes cost CZK440 with the tariff T30, which
is less than CZK450 with the tariff T80. When a higher portion of calls are within the
network, then the tariff T30 is even cheaper. Having less than 50% of calls within the
network is unlikely for a consumer who considers these tariffs because in this case, tariffs
of other mobile operators are more attractive and more likely to be considered. So, the
tariff T80 that, before any computations are made, looks good for making 80 minutes of
calls per month is generally not the cheapest for such consumption.
This example raises a natural question whether consumers who call 80 minutes per
month choose the tariff T80 despite the fact that it is more expensive for them than
the tariff T30. Answering this question is important for at least two reasons. The first
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one is related to developments in the contract design literature.1 A typical model in this
literature assumes that consumers who call 80 minutes per month would always choose
the tariff T30 as it is the cheapest for them. If some consumers rely on the framing of
tariffs when making judgments about their costs, e.g. consumers who call 80 minutes per
month mistakenly believe that the tariff with 80 free minutes is the cheapest for them,
then firms may use such framing to relax the incentive compatibility constraint and to
achieve higher profits. Hence, an alternative contract design problem can be constructed
and theoretically solved.
The second reason to study consumers’ choices of pricing schemes is related to con-
sumer protection. The European Commission is one of the authorities that cares about
this. It proposes a regulatory measure that would ensure that consumers of telecoms ser-
vices can easily access and compare information on prices, but does not specify the details
of such a measure. Moreover, making information on prices easily available and compa-
rable does not necessarily prevent consumers from choice errors, as this paper suggests.
The Office of Fair Trading in London is another authority interested in price regulations
that would help consumers to avoid choice errors. They commissioned a report on the
impact of price frames that was based on a controlled economic experiment done by Huck
and Wallace 2010. The experiment shows that various price frames distort consumers’
decisions on how much to search and how much to buy and result in overall welfare losses.
The framing of tariffs described above and studied in this paper has not been considered
in the reported experiment.
In this paper, I also use a laboratory experiment to address the question of interest.
It has several advantages over using the field data as an increasing number of studies do.2
A typical dataset from the field would contain individual choices of pricing schemes as
well as preceding and subsequent consumption levels. Using information on the realized
consumption and the available pricing schemes at the moment of choice, a researcher
can conclude whether individual choices of pricing schemes are ex-post sub-optimal, i.e.
whether a consumer could have saved had he chosen a different scheme. This approach
has two potential caveats. First, the fact that certain pricing schemes were available at
1Seminal papers on price discrimination and the importance of incentive compatibility constraints are
Mussa and Rosen 1978 and Maskin and Riley 1984. More recent examples can be found in Armstrong
1996 and Hamilton and Slutsky 2004. A good textbook reference is Laffont and Martimort 2001.
2Examples of field studies include consumers’ choices of health clubs contracts in DellaVigna and
Malmendier 2006, of local telephone tariffs in Miravete 2003, of mobile phone plans in Grubb 2009, of
tariffs for Internet access in Lambrecht, Seim, and Skiera 2007, of credit cards in Stango and Zinman
2009, and even of different-sized packages of light beer in Gu and Yang 2010.
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the moment of choice does not imply that a consumer had them in the consideration set.
Second, it is not clear at all whether a consumer correctly anticipated the consumption
level. Moreover, in most cases the information on what the consumption level would have
been with a different pricing scheme is not available even to a researcher. In line with the
last issue, the existing literature attributes the observed errors in the choice of pricing
schemes to consumers’ imperfect demand forecasting skills and suggests that providing
consumers with detailed feedback on past consumption would help solve the problem.
The advantage of the experimental approach to collecting data on consumers’ choices
of pricing schemes is that a researcher can have full information on what subjects know
about their future demand and, hence, can evaluate the quality of their choices ex-ante.
Observing ex-ante choice errors would imply that providing consumers with detailed feed-
back on their past consumption is insufficient in preventing sub-optimal choices. This
addresses the second mentioned problem of field data. In addition, using available tech-
niques to track how subjects acquire information on pricing schemes addresses the first
mentioned problem of field data.3 Particularly, a lab experiment makes it possible to see
which of the available pricing schemes subjects consider.
In the experiment reported in this paper, subjects are explicitly told that their demand
is a random variable with a discrete uniform distribution over a specified range. They
need to choose from a set of four pricing schemes that imitate the structure of those from
the motivating example in Fig. 2.1. Each of the first three schemes is the cheapest in
one-third of all experimental tasks, and the fourth scheme is there to control for potential
flat-rate and middle-alternative biases.4 The expected demand is emphasized in the
formulation of the experimental task, and the third pricing scheme offers the number
of free minutes exactly equal to the expected demand. I refer to this scheme as the
"matched" one. The lower bound of the demand range is never below the number of free
minutes of the second scheme and never above the number of free minutes of the fourth
scheme. This ensures that the "matched" scheme is the only one with a non-linear cost
function over the possible demand range (even though all four pricing schemes have a
non-linear cost function in general).
The main experimental finding is that with the overall error rate of 44.5%, subjects
3In the experiment reported in this paper, I use a mouse tracking tool, while eye tracking is another
available but more expensive technique.
4In case of flat-rate bias, subjects would be choosing the scheme with the number of free minutes
that always covers their demand, that is the fourth scheme. The middle-alternative bias should not be
profound when the number of available alternatives is even. If it is present, choosing each of the two
middle alternatives should be equally likely.
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choose the "matched" scheme when another scheme has a lower expected cost in 30.5%
of all cases. Overall, subjects choose the "matched" scheme in 42.3% of the cases. One
potential explanation is associated with the non-linear cost function over the possible
demand range that makes this scheme different from all others. As also argued in Grubb
2009, when subjects do not take into account that their demand is equally likely to be at
the lower bound, at the middle, and at the upper bound of the possible demand range
but instead assume that it will be always at the middle, they tend to underestimate
the expected cost of such a pricing scheme. Then they mistakenly believe that it is the
cheapest when it is not. The difference between this paper and Grubb 2009 is that here
the only reason for such consumer behavior is that they consciously choose to ignore the
information provided to them, while in Grubb’s field study it might be also the case that
consumers are unaware of their possible demand range.
Another possible explanation for the observed pattern in subjects’ choice errors is that
their choices are affected by an appropriate framing of pricing schemes. This explanation
is supported both by choice and information acquisition data. To collect information
acquisition data, all parameters of pricing schemes are covered at the beginning of each
experimental task. A subject needs to click on a particular parameter to see its value, and
he can uncover only one parameter’s value at a time. This feature of the experimental
design allows me to see where subjects start their search for the best pricing scheme.
Another important feature of the design is that in the first five sessions pricing schemes
are labeled with the number of free minutes, as in the motivating example, such that
subjects can infer where the "matched" scheme is, while in the last two sessions, pricing
schemes are labeled neutrally.
The analysis of the information acquisition data reveals some kind of status quo bias:
Subjects are more likely to choose a particular pricing scheme if they started the search
process with this pricing scheme. At the same time, they are significantly less likely to
start the search process with the "matched" pricing scheme when schemes are labeled
neutrally. This observation again suggests that the subjects’ choice of pricing schemes is
affected by framing in a systematic manner.
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I formalize the consumer
problem, list theoretical predictions, and discuss the underlying intuition. Then, I explain





For the purpose of this study, I assume that demand for a service is perfectly inelastic
with respect to all prices and income. In this case, consumers are only concerned with
satisfying their demand at the lowest cost and cannot adjust their consumption level to
the chosen pricing scheme. This restriction excludes biases in demand estimation and
dynamic inconsistency from the list of potential explanations for errors in the choice of
pricing schemes.5
There is demand uncertainty in the consumer problem, though. Particularly, the
demand level X is a random variable that follows a discrete uniform distribution with
the support [x1, ..., xΘ].6 This makes the consumer problem more cognitively demanding
as consumers now have to compute the expected cost of each pricing scheme. Formally,
the consumer problem is the following:
min
j={1,..,J}




S (xτ |j ) , (2.1)
where S ( |j ) is the cost function of pricing scheme j.7 There are J pricing schemes
available to consumers. Hence, the cognitive task that consumers face is to compute
S (xτ |j ) Θ times, to take the average, and to repeat the procedure J times.8 At the end,
the scheme with the lowest expected cost should be chosen.
All pricing schemes have the same three-part structure. Consumers have to pay a
fixed fee Fj at the beginning of each consumption period, then they get a bundle of Ij
units that can be consumed within this period for no extra charge. If the realized demand
is higher than Ij, consumers have to pay an extra-unit price Pj for every additional unit
consumed. The structure of pricing schemes defines the functional form of S ( |j ):
S (xτ |j ) = Fj + Pj max {0, xτ − Ij} . (2.2)
5This also rules out empirical complications that arise when choices of a pricing scheme and of a
consumption level are studied jointly, see e.g., Hanemann 1984.
6Upper case letters denote random variables; the corresponding lower case letters are their realizations.
7It is possible to impose the same consumer problem by introducing demand variation instead of
demand uncertainty, e.g. the consumer would know his deterministic demand in Θ periods, such that in
each period the demand would be equal to one of the values from the interval [x1, ..., xΘ]. We use this
approach in later studies.
8Of course, there are alternative computation routines to find the expected cost of each pricing scheme.
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I refer to the pricing scheme that solves the consumer problem as the first-best scheme.
Other pricing schemes are ranked based on their expected cost as the second-best, the
third-best, and so on. Standard economic theory predicts that consumers always choose
the first-best pricing scheme.
The ranking of pricing schemes relies on the assumption of a linear utility function
from money, particularly risk neutrality. The assumption is supported by the fact that
expenditure on the good under consideration is a small share of consumers’ income. I
further minimize possible effects of risk aversion with the experimental design. First, for
the ease of interpretation, subjects are given a fixed ex-ante known per-period budget B
and are paid the difference between the budget and the cost of the realized demand under
the chosen pricing scheme. Practically, under the assumption of a linear utility function,
they are incentivized to solve the following task:
max
j={1,..,J}
B − ES (X |j ) , (2.3)
which is equivalent to minimizing the expected cost ES (X |j ). The difficulty is that due
to a non-linearity of the utility function, the solution to the following utility maximization
problem might be different from the first-best scheme:
max
j={1,..,J}




U (B − S (xτ |j )) , (2.4)
where S (X |j ) is a random variable with up to Θ possible realizations.
To increase the chance of the utility maximization problem having the same solution as
the cost minimization problem, T consumption periods under the chosen pricing scheme
are introduced. In each consumption period, the demand is an independent realization
of X. Not to deal with time discounting issues, subjects learn T realizations and the
corresponding payoffs all at once, after they choose the pricing scheme.
Under the assumption of a linear utility function, the consumer problem becomes:
max
j={1,..,J}
T ∗ [B − ES (X |j )] , (2.5)
and its solution is still the first-best scheme. To see what happens with the utility
maximization problem, note that T ∗ S (X |j ) is a random variable itself with up to
(Θ+T−1)!
T !(Θ−1)! possible realizations. Some of the realizations might be identical for a certain
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cost function. In the original problem, each of S (xτ |j ) is equally likely to occur. After
T consumption periods are introduced, realizations close to T ∗ ES (X |j ) become more
likely than extreme values T ∗ S (x1 |j ) and T ∗ S (xΘ |j ). Even though the difference
in utilities from extreme and average realizations under non-linear utility functions is
different from this difference under the linear utility function, the probability of extreme
realizations becomes very small when more periods are introduced. This potentially solves
the problem with non-linear utility function.9
2.2.2 Predicted Choices
Finding the best pricing scheme in the consumer problem defined above is associated
with computing the cost S(xτ |j ) Θ times, taking the average, repeating the procedure J
times, and comparing the expected cost of all J schemes. This fully rational procedure
leads to the following prediction:
Prediction R. Consumers choose the pricing scheme with the lowest expected cost.
The fully rational procedure is unlikely to represent what consumers actually do as
computing S(xτ |j ) Θ ∗ J times is a pretty boring task, and it is even more so when
non-linear utility functions are allowed. I propose a number of calculation methods,
or heuristics, that consumers might be using instead. The considered heuristics vary
in their predictions what pricing scheme should be chosen from a particular set. The
predictions are derived assuming that demand is a random variable X that follows a
discrete uniform distribution with the support [x1, ..., xΘ], and this interval is symmetric
around the mean. Using the experimental data, it is possible to say how good each
decision rule is in predicting the subjects’ choices.
There is a heuristic that gives a very good approximation of the expected cost under
any pricing scheme. A consumer needs to compute his cost of the lowest, the mean, and
the highest possible demand, and to take the average of these three values. Values of
parameters used in the experiment are such that this heuristic always leads to the first-
best choice of a pricing scheme. Using only choice data, it is impossible to distinguish
empirically this heuristic from the fully rational procedure.
The next two heuristics allow for a precise computing of the expected cost under
any pricing scheme whose cost function is linear at the possible demand range, but are
misleading regarding the expected cost of the pricing scheme whose cost function is convex
9For the reader who is not convinced that the experimental design sufficiently minimizes the effect of
potentially non-linear utility functions, I discuss its predictions and performance in the Appendix.
44
at this range. With the first method, a consumer needs to compute only the cost of the
expected demand. With the second one, he needs to compute the cost of the lowest
and the highest demand and to take the average. With the first method, the consumer
underestimates the expected cost of the pricing scheme whose cost function is convex at
the possible demand range, while with the second one, he overestimates it.
I refer to the first method as the "expected demand" heuristic.10 Instead of taking
the average over {S (xτ |j )}Θτ=1, a consumer takes the average over {xτ}
Θ
τ=1. Then he uses
the expected demand EX = 1
Θ
∑Θ
τ=1 xτ to evaluate the cost of each pricing scheme j:
11
S (EX |j ) = Fj + Pj max {0, EX − Ij} , (2.6)
and the consumer problem becomes:
min
j={1,..,J}
S (EX |j ) . (2.7)
The "expected demand" heuristic might naturally lead to a bias towards a pricing
scheme whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range. I illustrate this for
the case when the following restriction on a number of included units under different
pricing schemes is imposed:
Ij∗−1 ≤ x1, Ij∗ =
x1 + xΘ
2
, Ij∗+1 ≥ xΘ, (2.8)
where j∗ ≤ J−1. The restriction implies that there is a pricing scheme j∗ with the number
of included units being equal to the expected demand. Also, the number of included
units in the scheme j∗ − 1 is never above the demand realization, while the number of
included units in the scheme j∗+ 1 is never below the demand realization. It means that
there is only one pricing scheme whose cost function is convex at the considered demand
range, while all others are linear at this range. The main consequence is that by using
the "expected demand" heuristic, the consumer underestimates the expected cost of the
scheme j∗ and only of this scheme:12
10It can be also named as the "average demand" or the "mean demand" heuristic.
11Note that under the assumption [x1, ..., xΘ] is symmetric around the mean, EX = x1+xΘ2 .
12This relies on the imposed assumption that the demand distribution is symmetric around the mean.
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S (EX |j ) = ES (X |j ) ∀j 6= j∗, (2.9)
S (EX |j∗ ) < ES (X |j∗ ) . (2.10)
If the difference between ES (X |j∗ ) and S (EX |j∗ ) is sufficiently large, a consumer
who follows the "expected demand" heuristic might decide that scheme j∗ is the first-best,
while in fact it is not. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction EDH. Consumers who follow the "expected demand" heuristic, have a
bias towards the scheme whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range.
The EDH prediction follows from the fact that consumers choose the scheme whose
cost function is convex at the possible demand range as long as this scheme has the lowest
cost for the expected demand, which may happen even when the expected cost of this
scheme is not the lowest.
The second calculation method that gives a wrong estimate of the expected cost
of the pricing scheme whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range is
the "minimum-maximum" heuristic. The heuristic works as follows: A consumer
computes the minimum and the maximum possible cost and takes the average:
SMM (X |j ) =
1
2




Pj (max {0, x1 − Ij}+ max {0, xΘ − Ij}) . (2.12)
Under this heuristic, the cost of pricing scheme j∗ and only this cost is over-estimated:
SMM (X |j ) = ES (X |j ) ∀j 6= j∗, (2.13)
SMM (X |j∗ ) > ES (X |j∗ ) . (2.14)
If the difference between ES (X |j∗ ) and SMM (X |j∗ ) is sufficiently large, a consumer
who follows the "minimum-maximum" heuristic might decide that scheme j∗ is not the
first-best, while in fact it is. This leads to the following prediction:
Prediction MMH. Consumers who follow the "minimum-maximum" heuristic are
averse towards the scheme whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range.
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The MMH prediction follows from the fact that consumers do not choose a scheme
whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range as long as it does not have
the lowest average cost for the minimum and maximum demand, which may be the case
even when the expected cost of this scheme is the lowest.
The heuristics presented above predict correctly which scheme is the first-best in a
wide range of cases. This makes their usage efficient, or ecologically rational. The next
heuristic leads to substantial deviations from the first-best choice, but it requires no
computations. I call it the "match" heuristic. This heuristic is to choose the pricing
scheme with the number of included units equal to the expected demand, unless it is
apparently worse than another scheme. The name of this heuristic comes from treating
the equality between the expected demand and the number of included units as a "match".
In the consumer problem considered here, the scheme that matches the demand is j∗.
The question is what makes the matched scheme apparently worse than another
scheme. I only consider the most obvious case — when the fixed fee of a scheme with a
larger number of included units is lower than the fixed fee of the matched scheme:
Fj∗+1 < Fj∗ . (2.15)
In this case, the consumer chooses the scheme j∗+ 1. Otherwise, he chooses the matched
scheme. The prediction of the "match" heuristic is the following:
Prediction Match. Consumers who follow the "match" heuristic have a strong bias
towards the scheme whose cost function is convex at the possible demand range.
The Match prediction follows from the fact that in the considered problem, the con-
sumers’ expected demand is always equal to the number of included units of the scheme
whose cost function is convex over the possible demand range. In most cases, the fixed
fee of this scheme is lower than the fixed fee of schemes with a larger number of in-
cluded units. As consumers do not even compute their expected costs, they choose the
scheme whose cost function is convex at the demand range simply because it matches
their demand the best.
While the "expected demand" and the "minimum-maximum" heuristics can be treated
as alternative calculation methods, the "match" heuristic is more than that. It suggests
how the starting point of a search process is determined. Within search models, both
rational and boundedly rational, a bias towards the alternative that is considered earlier in
the search process is a general prediction. In the next section, I discuss other implications
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of treating the choice of a pricing scheme as a search.
2.2.3 Predicted Search Patterns
Even though all pricing schemes available to consumers are located at one "store", con-
sumers do not immediately observe their values. To infer these values, consumers need to
compute how much it would cost them to satisfy their demand with each pricing scheme.
Such computations can be treated as search. The difference from standard search mod-
els is that consumers do not necessarily search sequentially when they need to choose
a pricing scheme, i.e. instead of doing a one-by-one evaluation, they might be doing a
parameter-by-parameter comparison. In Chapter 1 of this dissertation, the focus is on the
implications of this important difference. Here, predictions of standard alternative-based
search models applied to the choice of pricing schemes are derived and tested.
The alternative-based search process applied to the choice of pricing schemes can be
described as follows. A consumer starts with a pricing scheme j0 and computes how
much it would cost him to satisfy his demand with this scheme. He can either do the
full computation and learn ES (X |j0 ), apply the "expected demand" heuristic and learn
S (EX |j0 ), or apply the "minimum-maximum" heuristic and learn SMM (X |j ). Given
the restrictions used in the experiment, the result is different only for the case when
j0 = j∗. The next step would be different within the optimization-under-constraints
(Stigler 1961) and the satisficing (Simon 1955) approaches.
Within the optimization-under-constraints approach, the consumer needs to evaluate
the benefit of a further search and to compare it with the cost. When the consumer
deals with pricing schemes with immediately observable parameters, he can evaluate the
benefit of a further search using these parameters. Particularly, he can easily see the
difference between fixed fees and use it as an indicator of the benefit of a further search.
The steps would be the following:
1. Compare the difference between Fj0 and Fj1 with the search cost c1.
1.a. If the difference is larger than the search cost, compute how much it would cost
to satisfy demand under the scheme j1. Else, go to step 2, keeping the scheme j0 as the
current choice, jc.
1.b. Depending on the computation method used, compare ES (X |j0 ) and ES (X |j1 ),
S (EX |j0 ) and S (EX |j1 ), or SMM (X |j0 ) and SMM (X |j1 ). Keep the "winner" scheme
as the current choice, jc.
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2. Compare the difference between Fjc and Fj2 with the search cost c2.
...
The process continues until all pricing schemes are considered, that is, their fixed fees
are compared to that of scheme jc. The scheme that represents the current choice at the
very end of the process, is chosen. Notice that the search cost is allowed to be different
at every step of the search process. It is natural to assume that the search cost would be
correlated with parameters of the scheme that is considered. That is, the search cost is
likely to be higher when more arithmetic operations are required to compute the expected
cost under the considered scheme.
In principle, any choice of a pricing scheme can be justified by a particular sequence
of considering schemes in a combination with a particular level of search costs. A bias
towards schemes considered early in the search process should be expected. To make a
clear comparative static prediction, one needs to assume that consumers always process
schemes in the same order, and their search costs for schemes with the same number
of included units do not change over time. Based on this assumption, the comparative
static prediction is the following.
Prediction OUC. Assume that consumers use the difference in fixed fees to evaluate
the benefit of a further search. Other things equal, when the difference in fixed fees of
available schemes is lower, consumers are more likely to choose the scheme with which
they started the search process.
Next, consider the satisficing approach. Applied to the choice of pricing schemes, this
implies that the consumer compares the difference between his budget B and ES (X |j0 )
if he uses the "expected demand" heuristic, and SMM (X |j0 ) if he uses the "minimum-
maximum" heuristic, with his aspiration level A. The aspiration level does not have to be
the same every time when the consumer faces the problem of choosing a pricing scheme.
It might be adjusted to the previously achieved payoff and even to the currently observed
difference between B and the perceived cost of j0.
Again, a bias towards schemes considered early in the search process should be ex-
pected. A consumer’s consistency in the order of search and in the aspiration levels should
be assumed to generate the comparative static prediction:
Prediction SAT. Assume that consumers follow the satisficing approach. Other
things equal, when the difference between the budget and the perceived cost of the scheme
that they consider first is higher, consumers are more likely to choose this scheme.
In the standard search models, the order in which alternatives are considered is ran-
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dom as there are no observables that can be used to structure the search process. The
contribution of this study is a proposal to treat labels of pricing schemes as observables
that can be used by consumers to structure the search process. That is, if subjects
can construct a "match" between the immediately observable characteristics of pricing
schemes and their demand, they will start a search with the "matched" scheme. The
corresponding comparative static prediction is the following:
Prediction Label. When the number of included units is not reflected in the name
of pricing schemes, consumers are less likely to consider the "matched" scheme first.
As both search models predict, we should expect a bias towards the scheme that
subjects consider at the first step of their search process. This is reflected in the following
prediction on the correlation between the order of a search and the resulting choice of
pricing schemes:
Prediction Search. Consumers are more likely to choose a particular pricing scheme
when they start the search process with this scheme.
Notice, however, that there is endogeneity involved here. Consumers might be a priori
more interested in particular schemes and hence consider them first, and then, as both
search models predict, the scheme considered first is more likely to be chosen simply due
to the presence of search costs.
2.3 Experiment
2.3.1 Design
The experiment consists of 27 tasks, which are identical (but not exactly the same) for all
subjects, and 3 tasks are added in Session 3 and later ones to control for the subjects’ risk
attitude. The experiment is designed such that the subjects’ incentives to maximize their
expected payoff are equivalent to their incentives to choose a pricing scheme with the
lowest expected cost, ES (X |j ). In each of the 3 tasks added later, two pricing schemes
have the same expected cost, being the first-best. One scheme has a higher number of
included units and, hence, a lower variation in possible cost. A risk-averse subject prefers
such a pricing scheme even when the coefficient of risk aversion is close to 0.
Every task consists of a pricing-scheme choice and a consumption stage where no ac-
tion is required. In task t, a subject i has to select one pricing scheme out of four offered
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to him, J = 4 (see Fig. 2.4).13 He knows that his choice will determine his consumption
cost in six periods, K = 6. Demand in period k, Xtik, is an independent random vari-
able with a discrete uniform distribution over the interval [EX − 5εti, EX + 5εti], where
εti = {1, 2} defines the uncertainty level, low or high.14 The uncertainty level is fixed for
all consumption periods within a particular task for a particular subject, but it varies
across subjects and tasks. The way how uncertainty is introduced into the experimen-
tal design serves two purposes. First, demand uncertainty in one consumption period
makes the pricing-scheme choice cognitively demanding. Second, the presence of six pe-
riods minimizes the risk of having a too low or too high demand realization, and hence
minimizes possible effects of the subjects’ risk attitude.
The consumption stage gives subjects feedback on the chosen pricing scheme but does
not reveal whether it is the best choice. At the consumption stage, a subject observes the
realized demand for every consumption period k, xtik, his earnings from the corresponding
period, and the total earnings from the task (see Fig. 2.5). He is not aware of minimum
and maximum possible earnings in each task. The only action required from a subject is
to move to the next task by clicking on the only available button on the computer screen.
For every consumption period k in a task t, a subject i has a budget Bti. This
per-period budget is the same for all periods. It varies across tasks and subjects facing
different uncertainty levels. Earnings from a particular period are equal to the difference
between the budget Bti and the realized expenditure, conditional on the prior pricing-
scheme choice j, S (xtik |j ). The purpose of introducing such a budget is to present a
clear and direct incentive scheme to subjects: They get whatever they earn.
At the stage of pricing-scheme choice, a subject knows the rules of the game, the
values of EX, εti, and Bti. The rules of the game are explained in the instructions. The
experimenter reads them at the beginning of the experiment, and they stay open in a
separate window on the computer screen during the experiment.15 The values of EX,
εti, and Bti are explicitly shown on the screen at the stage of the pricing-scheme choice
(Fig. 2.4). The subject only lacks the information on the demand realization. He learns
13Three pricing schemes are needed to implement the conditions on the number of included units
introduced in Section 2.2.2. The fourth scheme is needed to control for a possible "golden middle" bias.
14Note that the support interval consists of 11 elements for every level of uncertainty. When
εti = 1, the set is {45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 55} units. When εti = 2, the set is
{40, 42, 44, 46, 48, 50, 52, 54, 56, 58, 60} units. In both cases, the same number of arithmetic operations is
needed for computing the expected cost. So, the complexity level is not affected.
15The instructions from the first two sessions are given in the Appendix. They differ fom the instruc-
tions for later sessions by the number of experimental tasks, the expected earnings expressed in ECU,
and the transfer rate from ECU to CZK.
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it together with the realized earnings after he makes a pricing-scheme choice (Fig. 2.5).
The subject cannot revise the pricing-scheme choice at the consumption stage.
A subject can learn the parameters of the pricing schemes, {Ftij, Itij, Ptij}j=1,...,4, at no
monetary cost by clicking on the specified cells of the table and "uncovering" them. He
can observe only one parameter at a time. The Mouselab Web tool records the sequence
of information acquisition together with the time span for which every parameter is
displayed on the screen.16 Subjects can take notes during the experiment. They can, for
instance, copy all the parameters they are interested in on a sheet of paper. The notes are
collected after the experiment, but subjects do not know during the experiment that this
will be done. At the stage of the pricing-scheme choice, a simple calculator is available
for making necessary computations. Data on performed calculations are also collected.
Prior to the experiment, there are two practice tasks to get subjects familiarized
with the structure of the experiment. They do not get earnings from the practice tasks.
Subjects work through the experiment at their own pace. After they complete all tasks,
the information on total earnings, which are the sum of earnings in all tasks, appears on
the screen (Fig. 2.6).17 In the experimental tasks, everything is measured in experimental
currency units (ECU). The final earnings are transferred to Czech crowns (CZK) at the
rate 1 ECU to 0.05/0.045 CZK depending on the number of tasks in the session.18
The values of parameters used in the experiment are such that the expected earnings
from scheme j in task t are the same for all subjects. At the same time, subjects are
assigned to different uncertainty treatments as shown in Table 2.1. In Session 1, εti = 1
for all t and i (treatment 1). In Session 2, εti = 2 for all t and i (treatment 6). In
Sessions 3-7, subjects are randomly assigned into one of four treatments (treatments 2-
5), where they get tasks with both εti = 1 and εti = 2. This enables estimating the effect
of uncertainty using within- and between-subject variations.
The bundles of included units are the same for all subjects in all tasks in all sessions:
Iti1 = I1 = 30, Iti2 = I2 = 40, Iti3 = I3 = 50, and Iti4 = I4 = 60 for all t and i.
I refer to the pricing schemes used in the experiment as "Included 30”, "Included 40”,
"Included 50”, and "Included 60”. In Sessions 1-5, the schemes are named this way in the
table used to present a decision task to subjects. In Sessions 6-7, the names are changed to
more neutral "Plan A", "Plan B", "Plan C", and "Plan D". All other parameters of the
16More information about the Mouselab Web tool can be found on its page: http://mouselabweb.org/.
17The sum of earnings in all tasks rather than earnings from a randomly chosen task is paid not to
reveal to subjects that the maximum expected earnings in some tasks are twice as high as in others.
18At the time of the experiment, 1 Czech crown was approximately 0.05 U.S. dollars.
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Table 2.1: Variation in uncertainty level across treatments and tasks: The demand
range is {45,46,...,50,...,54,55} in the case of low uncertainty and {40,42,...,50,...,58,60}
in the case of high uncertainty. The parameters of the pricing schemes are adjusted to
have the same expected earnings in a given task in all treatments.
task T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6 task T1 T2 T3 T4 T5 T6
1 L H L H L H 16 L H L L H H
2 L L H L H H 17 - H L L H -
3 L H L H L H 18 L L H L H H
4 L H L L H H 19 L H L L H H
5 L H L L H H 20 L L H H L H
6 L L H H L H 21 L H L H L H
7 - H L L H - 22 L H L L H H
8 L H L H L H 23 L L H L H H
9 L L H L H H 24 L H L L H H
10 L L H H L H 25 L H L H L H
11 L L H H L H 26 L L H H L H
12 L L H H L H 27 - H L L H -
13 L L H L H H 28 L H L H L H
14 L L H H L H 29 L L H H L H
15 L L H L H H 30 L L H H L H
pricing schemes are the same across sessions, and they are covered using the Mouselab
table. Hence, the only difference between Sessions 1-5 and 6-7 is in the former ones,
subjects immediately observe the number of included units under each scheme. The
expected demand is fixed for the entire experiment, and it is equal to the number of
included units under one of the schemes, EX = 50.
The extra unit prices vary across tasks, but they are the same for all subjects within
the same task: Ptij = Ptj for all i. To keep the expected earnings at the same level for
different uncertainty treatments, the fixed fees are adjusted across tasks and also across
treatments.19
To see whether subjects choose other than the first-best pricing schemes and to test
the validity of potential explanations, the following variations across the 30 experimental
tasks are imposed (see also Table 2.5). Among these 30 tasks, there are 10 tasks where the
scheme "Include 30” is the first best, 10 tasks where it is the scheme "Included 40”, and 10
tasks where it is the scheme "Included 50”. The tasks vary in the highest expected level
of per-period earnings, which is either 100 ECU (high-stake tasks) or 50 ECU (low-stake
tasks). The difference in earnings between the first-best and the second-best schemes
varies between 0 ECU and 30 ECU, and the difference in earnings between the second-
best and the third-best schemes is either 0 ECU or 10 ECU. The generated cost of a choice
19Variations in fixed fees are only needed to equalize the expected earnings under the "Included 50”
scheme in tasks with different uncertainty levels.
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error is between 10 ECU and 40 ECU. Due to the imposed variations in the parameters
of the pricing schemes and the uncertainty level, there is a variation in the predictions of
the decision rules introduced in Section 2.2.2. This variation is reflected in Table 2.5.
Table 2.2: Choice predictions under alternative computation methods in each task
depending on the uncertainty level: Those in bold do not maximize expected earnings.
task max cost of error predicted choice
payoff 2nd-best 3rd-best ES(X) S(EX) SMM (X) match
L H L H
1 100 10 20 I50 I50 I50 I50 I40 I50
2 50 5 10 I50 I50 I50 I40 I40 I50
3 100 10 20 I40 I40 I50 I40 I40 I50
4 100 20 30 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
5 100 20 30 I30 I30 I30 I30 I30 I50
6 100 30 40 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
7 100 0 20 I50,I60 I50 I50 I60 I60 I50
8 50 10 15 I40 I50 I50 I40 I40 I50
9 50 5 10 I30 I50 I50 I30 I30 I50
10 100 30 40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I50
11 100 30 40 I30 I30 I30 I30 I30 I50
12 100 20 20 I30 I30 I50 I30 I30 I50
13 50 20 25 I40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I50
14 50 15 20 I40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I50
15 50 20 25 I30 I30 I30 I30 I30 I50
16 50 10 20 I30 I30 I30 I30 I30 I50
17 100 0 20 I30,I60 I30,I60 I30,I60 I30,I60 I30,I60 I60
18 50 20 25 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
19 50 10 20 I50 I50 I50 I50 I40 I50
20 100 20 20 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
21 50 10 15 I30 I30 I50 I30 I30 I50
22 100 20 30 I40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I50
23 50 5 10 I40 I50 I50 I40 I40 I50
24 50 10 20 I40 I40 I50 I40 I40 I50
25 100 10 20 I30 I30 I50 I30 I30 I50
26 50 15 20 I30 I30 I50 I30 I30 I50
27 100 0 20 I40,I60 I40,I60 I40,I60 I40,I60 I40,I60 I60
28 50 10 15 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
29 50 15 20 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50 I50
30 100 20 20 I40 I40 I40 I40 I40 I50
2.3.2 Implementation
Data from the web-based experiment were collected in seven sessions. Except for Ses-
sion 2, when I conducted the experiment with CERGE-EI preparatory semester students,
subjects were undergraduate students from universities in Prague who registered in the
database for experiments.20 Sessions 1-5 were conducted in July-August 2010, at the
20Students can register in the database through the web-page: http://www.experimenty.eu/public/.
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CERGE-EI computer lab, which has 18 machines. Sessions 6-7 were conducted in March
2011, in the Laboratory of Experimental Economics in Prague.21 A total of 106 partici-
pants showed up. Available individual characteristics are summarized in Table 2.3.
The average time spent on the experiment was 47 minutes, and the average earnings
were 540 CZK. The average earnings were 529 CZK for those subjects who spent less
than the average time on the experiment and 551 CZK for those who spent more than
the average time on the experiment. The difference is small but statistically significant.
Table 2.3: A summary of individual characteristics, missing observations are present.
Individual characteristic S1 S2 S3 S4 S5 S6 S7 Total
Gender:
- male 10 8 16 8 11 10 16 79
- female 2 4 0 6 6 7 2 27
Field of study:
- economics 3 4 8 9 13 11 17 65
- other 9 7 8 5 3 6 1 32
Year of admission:
- before 2006 3 - 6 7 2 1 1 20
- 2006-2007 3 - 4 4 9 5 8 33
- after 2007 6 - 5 1 6 11 8 37
Year of birth:
- before 1986 4 3 8 7 2 2 1 27
- 1986-1987 4 3 3 3 6 5 11 35
- after 1987 4 1 4 3 8 9 6 35
Mobile operator:
- Vodafone 5 - 9 6 7 5 12 44
- Telefonica O2 3 - 5 4 7 9 1 19
- T-mobile 3 - 2 3 3 3 5 19
Number of subjects: 12 12 16 14 17 17 18 106
Avg. earnings (CZK): 537 509 551 542 554 525 549 540
Avg. time (minutes) 27 58 45 47 45 55 51 47
2.4 Results
2.4.1 Predictive Power of Alternative Choice Rules
The observed choices in 30 experimental tasks are summarized in Table 2.4.
21The web-page of the lab is http://www.vse-lee.cz.
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Table 2.4: Observed choices depending on the uncertainty level, low (L) or high (H):
Those in bold maximize expected earnings.
I30 I40 I50 I60 I30 I40 I50 I60
L H L H L H L H L H L H L H L H
1 .08 .1 .17 .14 .71 .69 .04 .06 16 .35 .46 .07 .12 .44 .35 .13 .08
2 .1 .13 .25 .17 .53 .58 .12 .13 17 .19 .2 .17 .1 .21 .08 .43 .63
3 .09 .06 .51 .32 .3 .38 .9 .25 18 .09 .09 .13 .09 .7 .74 .08 .08
4 .11 .1 .11 .14 .67 .71 .11 .06 19 .15 .02 .2 .1 .54 .85 .11 .04
5 .41 .5 .13 .06 .26 .33 .2 .12 20 .14 .11 .08 .06 .75 .65 .04 .19
6 .08 .07 .06 .07 .79 .74 .08 .11 21 .45 .28 .11 .09 .30 .47 .13 .15
7 .1 .05 .05 .13 .48 .23 .38 .6 22 .09 .04 .59 .62 .26 .35 .06 -
8 .13 .09 .4 .36 .28 .34 .19 .21 23 .04 .08 .47 .42 .42 .47 .08 .04
9 .21 .11 .21 .17 .45 .55 .13 .17 24 .13 .1 .48 .4 .33 .4 .06 .1
10 .02 .09 .77 .56 .12 .22 .1 .13 25 .43 .36 .09 .04 .38 .42 .1 .19
11 .46 .35 .1 .17 .37 .46 .08 .02 26 .56 .33 .12 .17 .25 .39 .08 .11
12 .52 .32 .1 .11 .17 .35 .21 .22 27 .14 .05 .33 .25 .1 .03 .43 .68
13 .06 .08 .62 .42 .19 .36 .13 .15 28 .08 .11 .19 .17 .68 .6 .06 .11
14 .06 .09 .69 .46 .12 .3 .14 .15 29 .04 .09 .12 .13 .83 .7 .02 .07
15 .47 .43 .15 .09 .25 .32 .13 .15 30 .02 .09 .79 .57 .04 .2 .15 .13
A pricing scheme is defined as the first-best if it is associated with the highest expected
earnings. Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the standard optimization theory
predicts that subjects always choose first-best schemes (Prediction R in Section 2.2.2).
The experimental data clearly reject this hypothesis.
Result 1. Subjects’ choices maximize their expected earnings in 55.5% of the cases.
Moreover, deviations from the first-best are not random, as Fig. 2.2 illustrates.22 Such
deviations are least common when the first-best scheme is "Included 50", the only one
with a convex cost function over the possible demand range, and most of the deviations
are towards this scheme. This informally suggests the idea that the "expected demand"
heuristic and the "match" heuristic are popular decision rules among subjects as only
they predict a bias towards the pricing scheme with a convex cost function over the
demand range. The following analysis supports this idea more formally.
First, the overall proportions of choices predicted by different decision rules are com-
pared. The proportions of predicted choices are presented in Table 2.5, and the com-
parison is done based on the paired t-test. Note that given the number of subjects that
participated in each uncertainty treatment, the "expected demand" heuristic predicts
a bias towards the scheme "Included 50" in 21% of the cases (Prediction EDH in Sec-
tion 2.2.2), and the "minimum-maximum" heuristic predicts aversion towards the scheme
"Included 50" in 6% of all the cases (Prediction MMH in Section 2.2.2).
22Formal marginal homogeneity tests are given in Table 2.8.
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Figure 2.2: Subjects’ choices of pricing schemes depending on which scheme is first-best.
Result 2: Subjects’ choices are predicted by the "expected demand" heuristic in 59.9%
of the cases. This is significantly higher than the proportion of choices predicted by the
maximization of expected earnings (t=6.91).
Result 3: Subjects’ choices are predicted by the "minimum-maximum" heuristic in
51.7% of the cases. This is significantly lower than the proportion of choices predicted by
the maximization of expected earnings (t=-8.54).
Table 2.5: The predictive power of the considered decision rules
Decision rule Correct predictions Uniquely the best predictor
# subjects correct predictions
Maximize expected payoff* .555 (.232) 12 .788 (.2)
"Expected demand" heuristic .599 (.219) 36 .681 (.213)
"Minimum-maximum" heuristic .517 (.224) 6 .517 (.246)
"Match" heuristic .445 (.165) 27 .571 (.155)
(*)This rule is equivalent to "minimize average cost for min, max, and expected demand".
The above results allow a discrimination between the "expected demand" and the
"minimum-maximum" heuristics: while the first one helps to explain more choices than
the standard choice theory, the second does worse than the standard choice theory.
The raw data on choices across experimental tasks presented in Table 2.4 reveal a
large variation across subjects and tasks. In those tasks where different decision rules
predict the same choice, most of the subjects make this choice. In those tasks where
different decision rules predict different choices, the corresponding schemes are more or
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less equally popular. This observation suggests that different subjects might be using
different decision rules. Table 2.5 supports this idea, where the total number of subjects
for whom a given decision rule predicts the largest share of choices, and no other decision
rule from those considered predicts the same share of choices, is presented. The most
notable result is a relatively good performance of the simple "match" heuristic that
predicts that "Included 50" should be chosen unless "Included 60" has a lower fixed fee
(Prediction Match in Section 2.2.2).
Result 4: The "match" heuristic is the best predictor for 25.5% of the subjects,
excluding those for whom a different decision rule predicts the same share of choices.
Admittedly, the decision rules considered in this paper are ad hoc and the above results
only say that some of them give better predictions than others. To understand whether
subjects indeed follow these rules, a different type of data should be used. In Chapter 1
of this dissertation, the process data have been used. Here, this type of data would not
be as illustrative as subjects were allowed to take notes and many of them simply copied
the parameters of the offered pricing schemes on the paper. This is a negative side of
letting them take notes. The positive side is that these notes are available for an analysis
and in some cases, they are very illustrative (see Fig. 2.7). Table 2.6 summarizes what
decision rules were followed by the subjects as it can be inferred from their notes.
Assuming that not taking notes or taking notes without any computations can be
treated as an indicator that a subject uses the "match" heuristic, the correlation coeffi-
cient between the variable that measures which decision rule is the best predictor and the
variable that measures which decision rule is likely to be used based on the notes is .522.
When the first variable is regressed on the second and the standard errors are clustered
at the subject level, the coefficient is statistically significant and equal to .551.
2.4.2 Choice of Pricing Schemes as a Search. The Role of Labels
In Section 2.2.3, the choice of pricing schemes is treated as an alternative-based search
process. Subjects are assumed to evaluate the cost of each pricing scheme until they
find the one which is sufficiently good. Under this assumption, they are more likely
to choose a particular scheme if they consider it at the beginning of the search process
(Prediction Search in Section 2.2.3). A joint analysis of process and choice data from the
experiment supports this prediction (see Table 2.9 and Fig. 2.3).
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Table 2.6: Computations made by the subjects on provided paper.
Computations # subjects The best predictor is:
FB EDH MMH Match
cost of min, max, and expected demand 5 3 - - -
cost of expected demand 16 2 11 - -
cost of min and max demand 7 - 2 1 2
cost of min or max demand 6 1 1 1 2
demand-neutral* 16 2 2 3 7
not identifiable 21 1 11 - 4
no computations 8 1 3 - 3
no notes 27 2 6 1 9
Total 106 12 36 6 27
(*)This includes computations like dividing a fixed fee by the number of included units,
difference between fixed fees, etc.
Result 5: Subjects are most likely to choose a particular scheme when they open its
parameter with the first mouse click in the experimental task.
As it follows from Fig. 2.3, subjects are most likely to choose the scheme "Included
50" no matter which scheme they open with the first mouse click, but the probability of
choosing it is the highest (53%) when it is considered first. It is also high (46%) when
subjects choose a scheme without opening any pricing scheme.
This observation may imply is that subjects endogenously pick their default option,
which they are more likely to choose at the end. The "match" heuristic suggests that
when subjects immediately observe the number of included units in each scheme, this
induces them to pick the scheme with the number of included units equal to the expected
demand as the default option (Prediction Label in Section 2.2.3). To test whether this
is the case, the first mouse clicks in the sessions where schemes are labeled as "Included
30" to "Included 60" are compared with those in the sessions where schemes are labeled
neutrally.
Result 6: The probability of opening "Included 50" with the first mouse click is 16.5%
(s.e. .0082) when schemes are labeled with the number of included units and only 7.8%
(s.e. .0084) when they are not. The difference is statistically significant.
One would expect that once subjects are more likely to choose the pricing scheme that
they open with the first mouse click, and they are more likely to open the "matched"
scheme with the first mouse click when labels of pricing schemes reflect the number of
included units, then subjects would be more likely to choose the "matched" scheme in
the sessions where schemes are labeled as "Included 30" to "Included 60". However, this
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Figure 2.3: The subjects’ choices of pricing schemes depending on the scheme that has
been opened first (percentage of corresponding choices).
is not what happens in the experiment. What happens is that subjects become less likely
to choose the scheme "Included 30" and more likely to choose the scheme "Included 60".
Result 7: Other things equal, the probability of choosing "Included 30" decreases and
the probability of choosing "Included 60" increases when labels of pricing schemes do not
contain any information about the parameters of pricing schemes. The probabilities of
choosing other schemes are not affected significantly.
My interpretation of this result is that putting the number of included units into the
labels of pricing schemes reduces the subjects’ ambiguity regarding the value of pricing
schemes. Their tendency to choose a safe option, "Included 60", is lower when they have
a better idea about the value of offered pricing schemes. Otherwise, it is easy for them
to discover the number of included units under each pricing scheme, to form a "match",
and to proceed in evaluating pricing schemes in the corresponding order.
When the choice of a pricing scheme is treated as a search process, there are clear
comparative static predictions how the variables that measure the satisfaction level and
the expected benefits of further search affect the probability of choosing a particular
scheme (OUC and SAT in Section 2.2.3). To measure the first variable, the difference
between the expected earnings of the scheme that is opened with the first mouse click
is used. To measure the second variable, the difference in the fixed fees between the
schemes is used. As the first-best scheme is controlled for, none of these variables should
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Table 2.7: The probability of choosing a particular pricing scheme
Variable Meaning
MALE =1 if subject is male, =0 if subject is female
ECON =1 if subject has an economic background, =0 otherwise
FIRST-BEST =1 if the corresponding scheme is first-best, =0 otherwise
F60 - F50 difference in fixed fees between "Included 60" and "Included 50"
F50 - F40 difference in fixed fees between "Included 50" and "Included 40"
F40 - F30 difference in fixed fees between "Included 40" and "Included 30"
SAT30 expected earnings of "Included 30" if it was considered first
SAT40 expected earnings of "Included 40" if it was considered first
SAT50 expected earnings of "Included 50" if it was considered first
SAT60 expected earnings of "Included 60" if it was considered first
NO LABEL =1 if number of included units is not in the label, =0 otherwise
Subjects’ choice
Included 30 Included 40 Included 50 Included 60
MALE -.0295 (.0369) .0278 (.0258) .0353 (.0487) -.042 (.008)
ECON -.0305 (.028) -.0005 (.0242) .0705 (.0375)* -.0447 (.0243)**
FIRST-BEST .1578 (.0353)*** .1383 (.0428)*** .1045 (.0375)*** .3745 (.0603)***
F60-F50 .0003 (.0007) .0003 (.0007) .008 (.0012)*** -.0006 (.0008)
F50-F40 .0006 (.0004) .0055 (.0008)*** -.0064 (.001)*** .001 (.0005)*
F40-F30 .0026 (.0005)*** -.0022 (.0007)*** -.0007 (.0006) .0008 (.0003)**
SAT30 .0009 (.0003)*** -.0007 (.0003)** -.0023 (.0004)*** .0002 (.0003)
SAT40 -.0013 (.0005)** .0005 (.0004) -.0012 (.0006)* .0001 (.0004)
SAT50 -.0014 (.0005)*** -.0009 (.0005)** -.00002 (.0005) .0004 (.0004)
SAT60 .0008 (.0008) -.0017 (.0007)** -.0023 (.001)** .0008 (.0006)
NO LABEL -.0398 (.0262) -.0134 (.0216) -.0066 (.0391) .0616 (.0238)***
pseudo R2 .165 .1678 .1328 .1074
# observations 3,033 3,033 3,033 3,033
∗ - 10% significance level, ∗∗ - 5% significance level, ∗∗∗ - 1% significance level
Entries are the marginal effects from the corresponding probit models.
Standard errors clustered at subject level are in parentheses.
affect the probability of choosing a particular scheme by fully rational consumers. The
estimation results reported in Table 2.7 suggest that this is not the case.
Result 8: Other things equal, the probability of choosing scheme j+ 1 decreases, and
the probability of choosing scheme j increases with the difference in the fixed fees between
the schemes j + 1 and j.
The result implies that subjects correctly respond to the expected benefits of a further
search, measured with the differences between fixed fees. Other explanations for the
observed patterns are also possible. The above result supports the optimization-under-
constraints approach. The next result supports the satisficing approach (see Table 2.7).
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Result 9: Other things equal, the probability of choosing a pricing scheme j that is
not opened at the first mouse click decreases with the expected earnings of the scheme
opened at the first mouse click.
Given that the above results are based on the aggregate data, it is impossible to say
whether both search models are supported due to a combined stopping rule used by a
typical subject or due to different subjects using different stopping rules. However, it
still suggests that the choice of a pricing scheme can be treated as a search process even
though all alternatives are immediately available.
2.5 Conclusion
In the experiment reported here, subjects have to choose a three-part tariff knowing that
their demand would be equal to one out of eleven possible numbers, and there would
be six demand realizations under the chosen tariff. This demand interval is symmetric
around the mean, and hence, the expected demand is equal to the number in the middle
of the interval. Subjects make the choice of a three-part tariff 27-30 times, with different
tariffs being offered every time. The main result of the paper is that subjects are prone
to choose the tariff with the number of included units equal to their expected demand
even when this tariff is not the first-best choice.
The most compelling explanation for the observed bias is that the three-part tariff
with the number of included units equal to the expected demand is in the experiment
always the only one whose cost function is non-linear at the demand interval. This
potentially makes subjects underestimate its expected cost. The second explanation that
is consistent with the subjects’ choices across experimental tasks and their mouse clicks
during the information acquisition process is the "match" heuristic: Subjects are more
likely to choose the scheme that seems to be a good fit to their demand type without
comparing its expected cost with the cost of other schemes.
A preliminary implication of the reported experimental finding is that real-life con-
sumers tend to react on labels and advertising campaigns according to how they perceive
themselves. That is, if an offer is promoted as the one to suit student needs, then most
students and only a few non-students would choose it. Students would be unlikely to
check other offers, while non-students would be unlikely to check carefully this offer. For
the regulating authorities this would mean a necessity to check whether "student offers"
are indeed the ones to fit student needs the best.
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2.6 Appendix
The Role of Risk Attitude
In the main part of the paper, I assume that consumers choose pricing schemes to maximize
their expected earnings, which is equivalent to minimizing the expected cost of consumption.
The assumption is justified by the experimental design feature that the chosen pricing scheme is
valid for six consumption periods. Still, some readers believe that consumers’ choices of pricing
schemes might be affected by their risk attitude. Here, I show that even when risk attitude is
taken into account, the main idea of the paper that subjects tend to simplify the problem and
as a result mis-perceive the values of the offered pricing schemes still holds.
To show this, I derive predictions and compare the performance of two (in some sense) gen-
eralized decision rules. The first one is the maximization of per-period expected utility assuming
the CARA utility function, u (z) = (1− exp (rAz)) / (1− exp (rA)), where z is the amount of
money, and rA is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion and allowing for the coefficients of
absolute risk-aversion to be equal to -0.1, -0.05, 0, 0.05, 0.10, and 0.15 (negative values represent
risk-loving and 0 represents risk-neutrality). For every subject, I choose the coefficient that
predicts the highest share of choices. The general predictions for the choices of risk-averse and
risk-neutral consumers are the following:
Prediction RA. Risk averse consumers tend to choose pricing schemes with a larger number
of included units even when expected earnings under these schemes are lower than those under
the pricing schemes with a lower number of included units.
Prediction RL. Risk loving consumers tend to choose pricing schemes with a lower number
of included units even when expected earnings under these schemes are lower than those under
the pricing schemes with a larger number of included units.
The second decision rule is to maximize the payoff from either the minimum, the maximum,
or the expected demand realization. Again for every subject, I choose the option that predicts
the highest share of choices. The second decision rule, heuristics, outperforms the first one,
optimization.
Result R1: When subjects are assumed to use heuristics, 61.4% (s.e. .0088) of the choices
can be explained. This is statistically higher than 59.1% (s.e. .0088) of choices the that can be
explained with optimization.
Results R2: When only heuristics or optimization are compared, the heuristics are the best
predictor for 53 subjects, and the optimization is the best predictor for 27 subjects.
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Instructions for the Experiment
General information
In this experiment, we study how consumers choose pricing schemes when their demand is
uncertain. Hence, you will have to choose a pricing scheme 27 times. Every time when you choose
a pricing scheme, you know that it will be used to determine your consumption expenditures in
the subsequent consumption periods. In every consumption period, you will be endowed with a
fixed budget and will be required to consume a certain number of units (to be explained below).
The consumption expenditures will be subtracted from your budget, and the rest of the budget
will be added to your experimental earnings.
Consumption periods
There are 27 tasks in the experiment. Every task consists of a pricing-scheme choice (active
part) and 6 consumption periods (passive part). In each consumption period, you are en-
dowed with a budget, and you are required to consume a certain number of units. You know
the precise size of the budget, but you do not know the precise number of units that you will
be required to consume. You only know the set from which this number will be randomly drawn
by the computer.
Within one task, the budget is the same for each consumption period, but the number of units
that you are required to consume is independently drawn for each period, so that it is likely to
be different. Consumption periods constitute the passive part of the experiment because you are
not required to do anything. You will only observe the realized number of units to be consumed,
your earnings in each period of the task, and your total earnings in the task.
Pricing-scheme choice
All pricing schemes that will be offered to you have a common structure:
Fixed fee: how much you have to pay per period to get a corresponding number of included
units.
Included units: how many units you get per period after paying the fixed fee.
Extra unit price: how much you have to pay for each unit consumed in addition to included
units.
Your pricing-scheme choice will be valid for 6 consumption periods. You will have to make this
choice 27 times. Before the experiment starts, you will go through a practice round where you
will have to make the choice 2 times.
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Determination of earnings
Your earnings from the experiment will be equal to the sum of your earnings in all experimental
tasks; tasks of the practice round will not be counted. Your earnings from a particular task
will be equal to the sum of your earnings in the 6 consumption periods. In every consumption
period, earnings will be equal to the difference between the given budget and the consumption
expenditures. The consumption expenditures will be determined by your pricing-scheme choice
and the uncertainty realization for the number of units you will be required to consume.
Your total earnings will be displayed after you complete all 27 tasks.
Your expected earnings are in the range between 8000 ECU and 12000 ECU*, depending on
your pricing-scheme choice. Choices made by other participants have no effect on your earnings.
However, if you are particularly unlucky with uncertainty realization, you may end up with
negative earnings. In this case, we will pay you the guaranteed minimum of 4000 ECU. Also,
you may be particularly lucky with uncertainty realization and end up with 22000 ECU. In
this case, we will pay you everything that you will earn.
*ECU stands for "Experimental Currency Unit", 1 ECU = 0.05 CZK.
Thus, your final earnings will be in the range between 200 CZK and 1100 CZK depending on
both your effort and luck.
Other Rules
If you have a question or a technical problem, raise your hand.
You are not allowed to talk to each other. If you violate this rule, you will be asked to leave the
lab without being paid even the guaranteed minimum.
You are allowed to take notes but only on the paper provided to you.
Before you start the experiment, you will see how it works in a practice round that consists of
2 tasks.
To start the practice round, fill in the login information provided to you and click the "Start
practice round" button.
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Table 2.8: The subjects’ choices of pricing schemes and paired marginal homogeneity
tests with the null-hypothesis that choice errors are random. Numbers in each cell of the
main table are frequency, row percentage, and column percentage. Only data from the
main 27 tasks are used.
1st-best scheme Subjects’ choice
Included 30 Included 40 Included 50 Included 60 Total
Included 30 371 111 345 127 954
.389 .114 .362 .133 1
.699 .151 .273 .399 .335
Included 40 72 500 269 113 954
.076 .524 .282 .118 1
.136 .682 .213 .355 .335
Included 50 88 122 648 78 936
.094 .13 .692 .083 1
.166 .166 .514 .245 .329
Total 531 733 1,262 318 2,844
.187 .258 .444 .118 1
1 1 1 1 1
marginal homogeneity test for: chi-square
Included 30 - Included 50 216.12***
Included 30 x Included 40 8.31***
Included 30 x Included 50 152.54***
Included 40 x Included 50 55.27***
Table 2.9: The subjects’ choices of pricing schemes depending on the parameter of which
scheme has been opened first.
First characteristic opened Subjects’ choice
belongs to scheme Included 30 Included 40 Included 50 Included 60
Included 30 vs. .221 (.009) .243 (.01) .4 (.011) .137 (.008)
not Included 30 .109 (.009) .266 (.013) .468 (.015) .157 (.011)
t-statistics 7.83*** -1.42* -3.73*** -1.51*
Included 40 vs. .09 (.016) .359 (.027) .424 (.028) .127 (.019)
not Included 40 .192 (.007) .238 (.008) .423 (.009) .146 (.007)
t-statistics -4.54*** 4.76*** .03 -.94
Included 50 vs. .086 (.014) .24 (.021) .531 (.024) .143 (.017)
not Included 50 .197 (.008) .252 (.008) .406 (.001) .145 (.007)
t-statistics -5.51*** -.53 4.82*** -.09
Included 60 vs. .167 (.025) .198 (.027) .419 (.033) .216 (.028)
not Included 60 .183 (.007) .255 (.008) .424 (.009) .139 (.006)
t-statistics -.6 -1.88** -.14 3.17***
no scheme vs. .131 (.031) .23 (.038) .459 (.045) .18 (.035)
some scheme .14 (.007) .252 (.008) .422 (.009) .143 (.006)















































Figure 2.5: A screen-shot of the feedback provided after every experimental task.
Figure 2.6: A screen-shot of the summary page of the experiment.
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Price Discrimination with Boundedly Rational
Consumers: When to Make Dominated Offers?
I suggest a bounded rationality explanation for the presence of dominated choice alter-
natives in markets. By dominated alternatives I mean those that are never chosen by
fully rational consumers. These are alternatives that violate consumers’ participation or
incentive compatibility constraints. The model is built upon the assumption that, due to
time or cognitive limitations, consumers have only a sub-set of available alternatives in
their consideration sets, from which they choose the best ones. The necessary condition
for the monopolist to benefit from offering dominated alternatives is that consumers with
a higher willingness to pay are more likely to have them in their consideration sets.
JEL classification: L11, D42, D83
Keywords: price discrimination, bounded rationality, limited search
0For helpful comments and suggestions, I would like to thank Levent Celik, Peter Katuscak, Avner
Shaked, Bilgehan Karabay, Ariel Rubinstein, Kfir Eliaz, and Maarten Janssen. All errors remaining in
this text are the responsibility of the author.
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3.1 Introduction
Consider the problem of traveling from city A to city B. There are several train and bus
options available. As it is generally believed, trains are more comfortable than buses, even
though there might be individual buses being more comfortable than individual trains.
Consumers have search costs, and they rarely consider all available options before deciding
to take one of them (unless they have a PhD in economics). Assume that the population
of consumers can be roughly divided into those with a high and a low willingness to
pay for the comfort. In this case, the first group of consumers would be more likely to
search among train options, while the second group will focus on bus options. Within
each category, each consumer type will search for the best quality-price combination. At
the end, it is likely that the quality-price combination of the train option chosen by a
consumer with a high willingness to pay will be dominated by some existing bus option.
The main idea behind the situation described above is that when consumers search,
those with a high willingness to pay consider different market alternatives than those with
a low willingness to pay. Firms who can price discriminate against such consumers might
also exploit their differences in search behavior. In that case, they extract a higher share of
consumer surplus by selling "dominated" offers. To clarify what I mean by "dominated"
offers, I provide another example from the Czech mobile phone market (Table 3.1).
This example is about standard three-part tariffs (i.e. a fixed fee, a bundle of included
calls, and a unit price for additional calls). In the Czech Republic, Telefonica O2 had five
such tariffs, and T-mobile had six of them in 2008. A noteworthy observation is that the
O2 plan "Silver" is more expensive than "Bronz" and the T-mobile plan "T80" is more
expensive than "T30" for a large consumption range. This range includes up to about
200 minutes of calls for O2 and up to about 140 minutes of calls for T-mobile.
The experimental evidence documented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation suggests
that consumers are more likely to consider those options that "match" their demand
expectations. For the case of three-part tariffs, these are the tariffs with included calls
equal to the expected consumption level. That is, O2 consumers who expect to make 100
minutes of calls are more likely to consider "Silver" than "Bronz". Similarly, T-mobile
consumers who expect to make 80 minutes of calls per month are more likely to consider
"T80" than "T30". This indicates a tendency among consumers to choose dominated
options. Correspondingly, by offering such options, firms can potentially extract a higher
share of consumer surplus.
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Table 3.1: Mobile phone tariffs offered in the Czech Republic by the major operators
in 2008. Graphs assume that at least 50% of calls terminate at the home network.
O2 Czech Republic T-mobile Czech Republic
Bronz Silver Gold T30 T80 T160 T300
fixed fee, CZK 180 555 890 190 450 650 990
free minutes 30 100 200 30 80 160 300
extra unit price, CZK:
- to own operator 3.1 2.7 2.5 3.2 2.8 2.8 2.8
- to other operators 5.2 4.4 4 4.8 3.6 3.2 2.8
SMS price, CZK 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Some would argue that pricing practices documented in Table 3.1 might be beneficial
for certain segments of consumers. Their argument could be that consumers get a higher
discount on a mobile phone when it is purchased with a bigger pricing plan (i.e. it
has more included calls and a higher fixed fee). Such extra benefits might explain why
consumers choose plans like "Silver" and "T80".
In this paper, I study a simplified model that allows me to address the question
whether firms have incentives to offer truly dominated alternatives, that is, such alterna-
tives that no consumers would rationally choose. For that, I introduce a particular type of
consumer cognitive constraint: They can only compare a limited number of alternatives,
but always choose the best one from those compared, or an outside option.
The main result of the paper is that this type of consumers’ cognitive constraint per
se does not make it profitable for firms to offer dominated alternatives. The necessary
condition for this to happen is that consumers with a higher willingness to pay are more
likely to have a dominated alternative in their consideration set.
The presence of dominated price offers seems to be typical not only for the Czech
mobile phone market. For instance, Miravete 2007 reports that every second company
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in the early U.S. cellular phone industry (1988 to 1992)1 has been offering at least one
dominated tariff before competition was introduced in the market. The situation changed
with the competition as new entrants were offering mainly non-dominated tariffs.
In this paper, I study a monopolist’s problem of what tariffs to offer to boundedly
rational consumers, without considering the effect of competition. My aim is to illustrate
how predictions of the conventional theory change when consumers deviate from fully
rational behavior.2
In what follows, I describe the model and provide reasoning that leads to the main
result. Two versions of limitations imposed on the consumer behavior are used. In the
first case, they evaluate only one bundle from those offered to them. They accept the
bundle as long as it satisfies their participation constraint. In the second case, consumers
compare two bundles. They choose the best from those compared, as long as it is better
than the outside option. These two cases are sufficient to illustrate the intuition behind
the main result.
3.2 Model
A consumer’s utility from consumption is characterized with a function u (θi, q), where θi
defines the consumer type and q measures his consumption. In this paper, I restrict the
analysis to the case of two consumer types: low with the probability λ and high with the
probability 1− λ. Standard constraints on the form of the utility function are imposed:
uq > 0, uqq < 0, u(θi, 0) = 0, u(θH , q) > u(θL, q) ∀q > 0, and uq(θH , q) > uq(θL, q) ∀q.
The monopolist offers N alternatives to the consumer. Tj = (qj, tj) describes an
alternative j, where qj is the consumption level, and tj is the price. Hence, the choice
alternative is a bundle.3 The consumer can choose only one bundle, and he can also
choose none. The latter one is an important assumption. In that case, consumption
1In the mid-1980s, there were about 300 non-overlapping cellular phone markets in the U.S., almost
all of them started with the monopoly stage and the duopoly was introduced shortly after that.
2It would be interesting to study how the competitive outcome is affected by the presence of boundedly
rational consumers. However, models of non-linear pricing in the context of competing firms are not well
developed yet, even assuming that consumers are fully rational. That is one reason why I focus on the
monopolist’s pricing strategies in this paper and leave competitive markets for future research.
3In the model, I consider bundles, as opposed to three-part tariffs used in the motivating example.
One reason to do so is to stay close to the traditional price discrimination literature, mostly familiar to
the reader, and to use its main results. Another reason is that three-part tariffs can be treated as an
implementation of the optimal menu of bundles for a large number of consumers types (see Bagh and
Bhargava 2008). As there are only two consumer types in my model and the monopolist can offer an
unlimited number of simpler pricing schemes, three-part tariffs become irrelevant.
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and, correspondingly, utility are equal to 0. The monopolist’s marginal cost, c > 0, is
constant.
The consumer knows his type when he chooses a bundle. The monopolist does not
know the consumer type when he designs and sells bundles. I first characterize the
standard solution to the monopolist’s price discrimination problem when the consumer
is fully rational and choosing a bundle is not associated with any kind of costs for him.
Then, I show how this solution is affected by the consumer’s inability to compare all
bundles. This inability can be motivated by zero choice cost for a particular number of
bundles and an infinitely large choice cost when the consumer considers an extra bundle.4
3.2.1 Rational Consumers
Under the assumption of risk neutrality, the fully rational consumer always chooses the
bundle that maximizes his net suplus Vij, regardless of the number of available bundles:
max
j
Vij = u (θi, qj)− tj, for i = L,H. (3.1)
By selling bundle Tj, the monopolist receives the price tj and incurs the cost cqj. Hence,
the social value of bundle Tj chosen by the θi-type consumer is equal to:
pij = u (θi, qj)− cqj. (3.2)
I restrict further analysis to the cases when the social value of all bundles is positive.
One of the standard results is that in the full information case, when the monopolist can
directly observe the consumer type, he offers the socially optimal level of consumption
and extracts the whole consumer surplus. This is defined as the first-best outcome.
Definition 1. The first-best outcome is bundle T ∗l for the θL-type, and bundle T ∗h for
the θH-type such that:
q∗j = arg max
q








where j = l when i = L, and j = h when i = H.
4In the present paper, I use the consumer’s inability to compare all bundles as an assumption. In
future research, I would like to model it as a consequence of a positive choice cost.
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When the monopolist cannot directly observe θi, he tries to screen the consumer type.
He offers two bundles, Tl and Th, such that the consumer self-selects into the bundle Tl
if his type is θL and into the bundle Th if his type is θH . In this case, the monopolist has
the following profit function.
πSB = λ(tl − cql) + (1− λ)(th − cqh), (3.5)
subject to the following set of constraints:
VLl ≥ 0 [PCL], (3.6)
VHh ≥ 0 [PCH ], (3.7)
VLl ≥ VLh [ICCL], (3.8)
VHh ≥ VHl [ICCH ]. (3.9)
Another standard result is that the monopolist can ignore PCH and ICCL, and he makes
PCL and ICCH binding in the optimum. The profit maximization problem becomes:
max
ql,qh
[λpl + (1− λ)[ph − VHl]] , (3.10)
where pl = u(θL, ql)− cql, (3.11)
ph = u(θH , qh)− cqh, (3.12)
VHl = u(θH , ql)− u(θL, ql). (3.13)
The solution is defined as the second-best outcome:
Definition 2. The second-best outcome is the bundle T SBl for the θL-type and the bundle
T SBh for the θH-type such that:
qSBl = arg max
q
[λpl − (1− λ)VHl] < q∗l , (3.14)
qSBh = arg max
q







< t∗l , (3.16)
tSBh = u (θH , q
∗
h)− V SBHl < t∗h. (3.17)
It is optimal for the monopolist to provide the θH-type with his first-best level of con-
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sumption and to induce a downward distortion in the consumption of the θL-type.5 This
leads to a reduction of social welfare. The θH-type receives a positive net surplus, while
the net surplus of the θL-type is zero. This reallocation of surplus from the monopolist
to the consumer does not directly affect the social welfare, but lowers the monopolist’s
profit. In what follows, I show that the distortion in the consumption of the θL-type can
be reduced in the precence of boundedly rational consumers.
The second-best profit can be expressed as:
πSB = λpSBl + (1− λ)[p∗h − V SBHl ]. (3.18)
It is higher than the profit from offering T ∗l alone when
(1− λ)V SBHl − λpSBl < (1− λ)p∗h − p∗l , (3.19)
and it is higher than the profit from offering T ∗h alone when
(1− λ)V SBHl − λpSBl < 0. (3.20)
For the special case when (1− λ)p∗h = p∗l , these conditions are equivalent.
3.2.2 Boundedly Rational Consumers: One Bundle Considered
Consider the following consumer behavior. The consumer knows his type. All alternatives
offered by the monopolist are available to the consumer, but he can compute his net
surplus for only one alternative, regardless of the total number. That is, his consideration
set consists of one alternative. If the net surplus of this alternative is nonnegative, then
the consumer buys it. Otherwise, he does not buy anything. I define this as the C (1)
procedure.
Assume that the probability that the consumer has a particular alternative in his
consideration set does not depend on the actual value of this alternative, which is equal to
the consumer’s net surplus. The reason is that having an alternative in the consideration
set implies being able to compute its type-specific value. If type-specific values of all
alternatives are explicitly given, which is rarely the case, then the model is not applicable.
When the consumer behaves as described above, the monopolist’s profit function from
5The downward distortion in ql is the case because uq(θL, qSBl ) > c, and uq(θL, q
∗
l ) = c, while uqq < 0.
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1 if Vij ≥ 0
0 otherwise




sji = 1 for i = L,H, (3.23)
where sji is the probability that the consideration set of the θi-type consists of an alter-
native j, and f(Vij) is the decision rule of the θi-type who has an alternative j in his
consideration set that tells him whether to buy this alternative or not. Each element of
the profit function is the monopolist’s profit from selling a particular bundle weighted by
the probability that the corresponding consumer type has this bundle in his consideration
set, and conditioned on that this consumer type extracts a non-negative net surplus from
this bundle.
Before stating the main result, I make two important observations. The first one
implies that it is no longer optimal to offer the second-best bundles (T SBl , T SBh ) when the
consumer behaves according to the C(1) procedure.
Lemma 1. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (1) procedure. Every
bundle that the monopolist offers is the first-best for at least one consumer type.
Proof. First, assume that the monopolist offers only one bundle. Then, even with the
fully rational consumer, there are no incentive compatibility constraints. The monopolist
can either serve both consumer types or completely exclude the θL-type. In the first case,




= p∗l . (3.24)
The optimal bundle in this case is the first-best bundle for the θL-type. In the second




= (1− λ)p∗h. (3.25)
The optimal bundle in this case is the first-best bundle for the θH-type.
78
I present this standard analysis of pooling and excluding solutions here because the
logic extends to the case when the monopolist offers more than one bundle to the con-
sumer who follows the C(1) choice procedure. This is so because incentive compatibility
constraints are irrelevant under this assumption on consumer behavior.
Assume that the monopolist offers N bundles such that M < N bundles leave a non-
negative net surplus to both consumer types, while the remaining N −M > 0 bundles
exclude the θL-type. Then the PCL will bind for M bundles, and the PCH will bind for













Optimally, the first M bundles are equivalent to the first-best bundle of the θL-type, T ∗l ,
and the remaining N −M bundles are equivalent to the first-best bundle of the θH-type,
T ∗h , because the monopolist has incentives to maximize the social welfare.
The intuition behind Lemma 1 is rather straightforward. The θH-type buys any bundle
from his consideration set that satisfies his participation constraint. It makes no sense to
offer a bundle that does not satisfy PCH . Leaving any information rent to the θH-type
makes sense only if the monopolist wants the θL-type to choose this bundle. Leaving
any information rent to the θL-type makes no sense. As the monopolist can extract the
full surplus of the θH-type without distorting the consumption of the θL-type, it is sub-
optimal to impose any distortions. Effectively, the monopolist offers at most two distinct
bundles, a notion that deserves some discussion.
Definition 3. Bundles Tj and Tk are distinct if tj 6= tk, or qj 6= qk when both j and k
satisfy PCH . When both bundles violate PCH , they are treated as identical. 6
The notion of distinct bundles together with equation (3.26) brings up an interesting
issue. The monopolist can affect his profit by altering M and N , the number of bundles
equivalent to T ∗l and to T ∗h . The effect comes from a change in the probability that a
particular consumer type will check a bundle equivalent to the bundle T ∗h . The higher
6The second part of the definition becomes important when the consumer can have two alternative in
his consideration set. In that case, it might be optimal for the monopolist to offer a bundle that violates
PCH . The purpose of such bundle is to relax the incentive compatibility constraint of the θH -type for
the second bundle in his consideration set. The parameters of such bundle are not well-defined because
it is possible to achieve VHj < 0 with a large number of combinations (qj , tj).
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L, the lower the profit. The higher this




H , the higher the profit.
7
The second important observation implies that the monopolist never offers more than
two distinct bundles.
Lemma 2. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C(1) procedure. The
optimal number of distinct bundles never exceeds the number of consumer types.
Proof. The result follows directly from Lemma 1, particularly from equation (3.26).
There, the first M bundles are all equivalent to the bundle T ∗l , and the remaining N −M
bundles are all equivalent to the bundle T ∗h . All together, there are at most two distinct
bundles when there are two consumer types.
Based on Lemma 1 and Lemma 2, there are only three possible optimal pricing strate-
gies for the monopolist, when the consumer chooses according to the C(1) procedure.
These strategies are the following: (a) to offer a single bundle T ∗l , (b) to offer a single
bundle T ∗h , and (c) to offer both T ∗l and T ∗h . The choice over these three strategies depends
on the probability that the consumer is of a particular type, on the parameters of the
utility function, and on the probability that a particular consumer type has a particular
bundle in his consideration set. The central result is stated below.
Proposition 1. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (1) procedure. It
is optimal for the monopolist to offer two distinct bundles Tl and Th only if the bundle
Th is more likely to be in the consideration set of the θH-type consumer than in the
consideration set of the θL-type consumer, i.e., shH > shL.
Proof. By Lemma 1, if the monopolist offers two distinct bundles, these are the first-best






= (λslL + (1− λ)slH)p∗l + (1− λ)shHp∗h. (3.27)
7The model that I study in this paper is restrictive in the sense that it does not endogenize the
probabilities shL and s
h
H . One seemingly natural way to endogenize them would be through the choice
of N and M . However, this would not solve the problem because ad hoc assumptions on the nature of
sjL and s
j
H would still have to be made. A preferred solution would be to model how the structure and
the parameters of offered bundles, together with the way how the monopolist advertises the bundles,
affect the probabilities that different consumer types have them in their consideration sets. I leave this
for future research with a comment in the concluding section. In this paper, I focus on the requirements
that need to be imposed on shL and s
h
H to achieve desirable results.
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The profit from offering both bundles T ∗l and T ∗h is higher than the profit from offering
only the first-best bundle T ∗l , which is equal to p∗l , when the following condition is satisfied
(note that sli = 1− shi ):
(1− λ)shHp∗h > (λshL + (1− λ)shH)p∗l . (3.28)
The profit from offering only T ∗h is equal to (1− λ)p∗h. The profit from offering both T ∗l
and T ∗h is higher than this when the following condition is satisfied:
(1− λshL − (1− λ)shH)p∗l > (1− λ)(1− shH)p∗h. (3.29)
To guarantee that offering two distinct bundles is more profitable than offering a single













By Lemma 2, the three pricing stretegies considered above are the only possible optimal
strategies. Hence, the condition (3.30) is the sufficient condition for the offer of two
distinct first-best bundles T ∗l and T ∗h to be the optimal strategy. The condition (3.30) is
satisfied only if shH > shL, which proves the proposition.
It follows from the condition (3.30) that the bigger the difference between shH and
shL, the more likely it is that the monopolist benefits from offering both bundles. In the
extreme case with shH = 1 and shL = 0, the monopolist always offers both bundles. In the
special case when (1− λ) p∗h = p∗l , the necessary condition is also sufficient.
In this context, T ∗h is a dominated bundle for both consumer types. When both
bundles T ∗l and T ∗h are in the consideration set, T ∗h is not chosen by any of the two possible
consumer types. This is the definition of dominated bundles that I use in this paper.
Definition 4. A bundle Tj is the dominated one for the θi-type consumer if he never
chooses this bundle when all available bundles are in his consideration set.
For future discussion, it is important to realize that all bundles that violate the con-
sumer’s incentive compatibility constraints are dominated for him. The presence of dom-
inated bundles is justified by the consumer’s failure to include all available bundles into
the consideration set.
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Profitability of dominated bundles due to the presence of boundedly rational con-
sumers is the central question of this paper. For the consumer who follows the C(1)
procedure, I showed that this would not be the case unless the consumer with a higher
willingness to pay has a higher probability of having the dominated bundle T ∗h in his
consideration set. In the next section, I show that a similar condition is required when
consumers’ cognitive abilities are less limited.
3.2.3 Boundedly Rational Consumers: Two Bundles Considered
In the previous section, including an additional bundle into the consideration set is too
costly for the consumer. Hence, he does not buy anything if the only bundle included
into the consideration set is worse than the outside option. In this case, the monopolist
may benefit from offering two first-best bundles T ∗l and T ∗h if the θH-type consumer has a
higher probability of having the dominated bundle T ∗h in his consideration set. It is never
optimal to offer more than two distinct bundles nor to offer two second-best bundles. In
this section, I extend these results.
Here, the consumer has two bundles in his consideration set and chooses the best out
of them. If both give him a negative net surplus, the consumer does not buy anything. I
define this as the C (2) procedure. In this paper, I do not allow the consumer to choose
whether to follow C(1), C(2), or a more advanced procedure. His choice procedure is an
exogenous constraint which is known ex ante to the monopolist.
When the consumer behaves according to the C(2) choice procedure, the monopolist’s











where f(Vij, Vik) =

1 if [Vij > Vik ∪ (Vij = Vik ∩ qj > qk)] ∩ Vij ≥ 0
1/2 if Tj = Tk
0 otherwise
(i = L,H),
where sjki is the probability that the θi-type has bundles j and k in his consideration set,
and f(Vij, Vik) is his choice rule in this case. The choice rule is sensitive to the order of its
arguments, i.e. f(Vij, Vik) = 1− f(Vik, Vij), and the first bundle, Tj, is the one to which
the choice rule is applied.
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Under the standard restrictions imposed on the utility function, most importantly,
the single crossing property, only the following four types of bundles are feasible and
might be profitable for the monopolist to offer: (1) Ta such that VLa = 0 and VHa > 0;
(2) Tb such that VLb < 0, VHb = VHa, and qb > qa; (3) Tc such that VLc < 0 and VHc = 0;
and (4) Td such that VLd < 0 and VHd < 0.8 In principle, there might be several bundles
within each category, but as I show later, they would not be distinct bundles.
The θL-type buys only the Ta bundle as long as he has it in the consideration set.
Otherwise, he does not buy anything. This explains why offering Ta might be optimal.
More importantly, the θH-type buys the Ta bundle when he compares it with the Tc and
Td bundles, and he buys Tb bundle when he compares it with the Ta, Tc, and Td bundles.
This explains why offering Tb might be optimal. This bundle might be needed only when
the bundle Ta is offered. Only with the Tc bundle the monopolist can extract the whole
surplus of the θH-type. This is why offering Tc might be optimal. However, the θH type
buys the Tc bundle when he has only Tc and Td in the consideration set. To make it
possible, the monopolist should add Td every time he adds Tc. Otherwise, Tc is always
compared with a better bundle and, hence, is never chosen.
A further analysis of the profit function leads to the following conclusion:
Lemma 3. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (2) procedure. Only the
following pricing strategies can be optimal: (1) a single bundle Ta or Tc; (2) two bundles
Ta and Tb; (3) three bundles Ta, Tc, and Td; and (4) four bundles Ta, Tb, Tc, and Td.
Proof. In Appendix.
It follows that the bundle Tc is always equivalent to the first-best bundle of the θH-
type, T ∗h . The bundle Ta is equivalent to the first-best bundle of the θL-type, T ∗l , when it
is offered without the bundle Tb. When bundles Ta and Tb are offered together, there is
a distortion in qa and a positive net surplus is left to the θH-type (because the incentive
compatibility of Tb with respect to Ta for the θH-type has to be maintained).
The monopolist’s choice of a particular strategy listed in Lemma 3 naturally depends
on the differences in the parameters of the utility function and in the choice behavior
of each consumer type, as well as on λ. The higher the monopolist’s expected profit is
from serving the θH-type compared to serving the θL-type, the more likely he is to offer
8A bundle Tj such that VLj ≥ 0 and VHj ≤ 0 is impossible due to the restriction on the utility
function that u(θH , q) > u(θL, q) ∀q > 0. A bundle Tj such that VLj > 0 and VHj > 0 is never profitable
because the monopolist can extract the whole surplus of the θL-type without any trade-off.
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the bundle T ∗h alone. If the difference in profits from serving θH- and θL-types is not
sufficiently high, the monopolist would be better off by offering a mixture of bundles or
the bundle T ∗l alone.
The focus of this paper is on the necessary conditions under which offering dominated
bundles is optimal for the monopolist. Notice in Lemma 3 that the dominated bundles
are a part of the optimal pricing strategy only when three or four bundles are offered.
In both cases, these are two bundles, T ∗h and Td. Neither of them would be ever chosen
by a fully rational consumer nor by the consumer who follows the C(2) procedure and
has only one of them in his consideration set. In general, offering a single dominated
bundle is never profitable when the consumer follows the C(2) choice procedure. The
latter explains why these bundles have to be offered together. In that case, the C(2)
consumer chooses T ∗h .
Proposition 2 extends the central result of the paper, summarized in Proposition 1
for the consumer who follows the C(1) choice procedure.
Proposition 2. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (2) procedure. It
is optimal for the monopolist to offer dominated bundles T ∗h and Td only if the θH-type
is more likely to have only dominated bundles in his consideration set than the θL-type.
Proof. The claim made in the proposition implies that shdH > shdL when three bundles
T ∗l , T ∗h and Td are offered, and rhdH > rhdL + rbdL + rbhL when four bundles Ta, Tb, T ∗h and
Td are offered (to distinguish these two cases, I use sjki and r
jk
i for the corresponding
probabilities when three or four bundles are offered). The latter is the case because Tb
is dominated for the θL-type. To prove the claim, I derive the necessary conditions for
pricing strategies (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) and (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be optimal. For those conditions, as
well as sufficient conditions for these pricing strategies being optimal, see Appendix.
The reader might be interested in learning what determines whether the strategy
(Ta, Tb, T
∗
h , Td) or (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) is profitable. This, of course, depends on the probabilities
for each consumer type to have particular bundles in his consideration set in each case. To
see the condition more clearly, note that the monopolist’s profit from the pricing strategy
(T ∗l , T
∗






≥ (λra.L + (1− λ)(rahH + radH ))p∗l − (1− λ)rb.HV ∗Hl + (1− λ)(rb.H + rhdH )p∗h (3.32)
because the monopolist can adjust the distortion in qa and the net surplus left to the
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θH-type if this increases his profit. This profit is higher than the profit from the pricing
strategy (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) when the following inequality holds:
(λ(ra.L −sl.L)+(1−λ)(rahH +radH −sl.H))p∗l +(1−λ)(rb.H +rhdH −shdH )p∗h > (1−λ)rb.HV ∗Hl, (3.33)
which is as likely to be satisfied as violated.
The purpose of this section was to show that the result obtained for the C(1) consumer
holds also when the consumer can have more market alternatives in his consideration
set. The result is that the presence of consumers with limited cognitive abilities per
se does not make it optimal for the monopolist to offer bundles that violate incentive
compatibility constraints. The necessary condition for such bundles to be a part of
the optimal pricing strategy is that the consumer with a higher willingness to pay is
more likely to have dominated bundles in his consideration set than the consumer with
the lower willingness to pay (remember that dominated bundles might be different for
different consumer types). The patterns of the profit function documented in this section
suggest that this condition would be required also in more general cases.
3.3 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I study price discrimination with two consumer types when the consumer’s
cognitive abilities are limited. The limitation that I introduce is the following: a consumer
has only an ex ante determined number of available alternatives in his consideration
set, but he always chooses the best alternative from this set. If none of the compared
alternatives is preferred to the outside option, then the consumer does not buy anything.
The main result of the paper is that the monopolist can only exploit this type of
consumers’ cognitive constraints when consumers of different types have different alter-
natives in their consideration sets. Particularly, consumers with a lower willingness to
pay should be less likely to have dominated choice alternatives in their consideration set
than consumers with a higher willingness to pay.
The reason underlying the result is that dominated options would violate the partic-
ipation constraint of consumers with a lower willingness to pay and the incentive com-
patibility constraint of consumers with a higher willingness to pay. One of them would
still satisfy the participation constraint of consumers with a higher willingness to pay.
Hence, consumers with a lower willingness to pay would walk away, while consumers with
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a higher willingness to pay would generate a higher profit for the monopolist.
It is natural to ask whether the condition specified above is likely to hold. Evidence
documented in Chapter 2 of this dissertation suggests an affirmative answer. There I
observe that subjects who are assigned 50 units of expected consumption are more likely
to choose the three-part tariff with 50 units of included consumption than any other
tariff, even when this tariff is the dominated one. Moreover, the probability to choose
this dominated tariff is higher when the proper tariff is further away, i.e. has 30 rather
than 40 units of included consumption. Another result in this experimental study is
that subjects are more likely to start the choice process from the tariff with 50 units of
"free" consumption (compared to the tariffs with 40 or 60 units), especially, when this
information is reflected in the labels of the tariffs.
The experimental evidence can be interpreted as a possibility for firms to suggest
to consumers which tariffs to compare by the means of appropriate characteristics (e.g.
number of included units). Such suggestions would be consumer specific as opposed to the
standard advertising of particular tariffs. This would help firms to ensure that different
types of consumers have different tariffs in their consideration sets and make it optimal
to offer dominated tariffs.
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3.4 Appendix
When the consumer behaves according to the C(2) choice procedure, the monopolist’s











where f(Vij, Vik) =

1 if [Vij > Vik ∪ (Vij = Vik ∩ qj > qk)] ∩ Vij ≥ 0
1/2 if Tj = Tk
0 otherwise
(i = L,H).
Below, I prove Lemma 3 that characterizes the only possible optimal pricing strategies
when consumers choose according to the C(2) procedure. The proof is based on the
observation that due to the constraints imposed on the utility function, the only feasible
and potentially optimal types of bundles are the following: (1) Ta such that VLa = 0 and
VHa > 0; (2) Tb such that VLb < 0 and VHb = VHa; (3) Tc such that VLc < 0 and VHc = 0;
and (4) Td such that VLd < 0 and VHd < 0.
In words, Ta is the bundle that extracts the whole surplus of the θL-type; Tb is the
bundle which is incentive compatible with Ta for the θH-type; Tc is the bundle that
extracts the whole surplus of the θH-type; and Td is the bundle that creates a possibility
that the θH-type compares Tc with neither Ta nor Tb, which both give the θH-type a
positive net surplus. In the proof of Lemma 3, I use the following lemma saying that it
is never optimal for the monopolist to offer two distinct bundles of the same type.
Lemma 4. Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C(2) procedure. Bundles
of the types Ta, Tb, Tc, and Td, as defined above, are available to the monopolist. It is
never optimal for the monopolist to offer more than one distinct bundle of each type.
Proof. The statement is true by the definition of distinct bundles when it is applied to
bundles of the type Td. Every other bundle of this type is defined to be equivalent to the
existing one. Hence, there cannot be more than two distinct bundles of the type Td.
The statement is straightforward when it is applied to bundles of the type Tc. There
is only one bundle of this type that can be ever optimal for the monopolist to offer. This
is the first-best bundle of the θH-type, T ∗h .
Offering the bundle Tb only makes sense when the bundle Ta is offered; otherwise, the
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whole surplus of the θH-type can be extracted with the bundle Tc. The parameters of the
bundle Ta depend on the presence of the bundle Tb. If it is not present, then the bundle
Ta is the first-best bundle for the type θL, T ∗l . Otherwise, there is a downward distortion
in the consumption level qa. Below, I construct two cases showing that it is not optimal
to offer two distinct bundles of the type Ta or Tb.
(a) Offering two bundles of the type Tb is not optimal (by contradiction).
Assume that only one bundle of the type Ta, T 1a , and two bundles of the type Tb, T 1b
and T 2b , are offered. Both Tb bundles have to be incentive compatible with the bundle
T 1a for the type θH : VHb1 = VHb2 = VHa1 . Parameters of bundles Ta and Tb do not affect
the monopolist’s profit from offering other types of bundles. Hence, we can look at the
profit maximization problem for the bundles T 1a , T 1b , and T 2b in isolation from the profit
from other bundles.
Given that VHb1 = VHb2 , bundles T 1b and T 2b are distinct only if q1b 6= q2b . Without a
loss of generality, assume that q1b > q2b . Then, the choice rules are the following:
f(VLa1 , VLb1) = f(VLa1 , VLb2) = 1, (3.35)
f(VLb1 , VLa1) = f(VLb2 , VLa1) = f(VLb2 , VLb1) = f(VLb1 , VLb2) = 0, (3.36)
f(VHb1 , VHa1) = f(VHb2 , VHa1) = f(VHb1 , VHb2) = 1, (3.37)
f(VHa1 , VHb1) = f(VHa1 , VHb2) = f(VHb2 , VHb1) = 0. (3.38)
The θL-type never chooses bundles Tb1 and Tb2 . The choice of the θH-type depends on
what bundles he has in his consideration set.







a − cq1a) + (3.39)








b − cq2b )]
t1a = u(θL, q
1
a), (3.40)
t1b = u(θH , q
1
b )− u(θH , q1a) + t1a, (3.41)
t2b = u(θH , q
2
b )− u(θH , q1a) + t1a. (3.42)
First-order conditions with respect to q1b and q2b require that uq(θH , q1b ) = uq(θH , q2b ) = c.
This implies that q1b = q2b = qFBh . This contradicts the assumption that q1b > q2b . This, in
turn, implies that if two bundles of the type Tb are offered, they are not distinct.
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(b) Offering two bundles of the type Ta is not optimal (direct proof).
Assume that two bundles of the type Ta, T 1a and T 2a , and one bundle of the type Tb, T 1b ,
are offered. Both bundles T 1a and T 2a extract the whole suplus of the θL-type. Hence, to
be distinct, they need to have different consumption levels. Without a loss of generality,
assume that q1a > q2a. Then only one of them, namely T 2a , can be incentive compatible
with T 1b for the θH-type. Optimally, T 1a should be the first-best bundle for the θL-type,
T ∗l . Then the choice rules are:
f(V ∗Ll, VLa2) = f(V
∗
Ll, VLb1) = f(VLa2 , VLb1) = 1, (3.43)
f(VLa2 , V
∗
Ll) = f(VLb1 , V
∗
Ll) = f(VLb1 , VLa2) = 0, (3.44)
f(V ∗Hl, VHa2) = f(V
∗
Hl, VHb1) = f(VHb1 , VHa2) = 1, (3.45)
f(VHa2 , V
∗
Hl) = f(VHa2 , VHb1) = f(VHb1 , V
∗
Hl) = 0. (3.46)





















h − VHa2). (3.47)
This profit is higher than the profit from offering a single bundle T ∗l when the following
condition is satisfied:
(λsabL + (1− λ)sabH )p∗l < B, (3.48)








h − VHa2). (3.49)
The profit from offering (T ∗l , T 2a , T 1b ) is higher than the second-best profit when the fol-
lowing condition is satisfied:
(1− λsabL − (1− λ)sabH )p∗l > λpSBl + (1− λ)(p∗h − V SBHl −B. (3.50)
The profit from (T ∗l , T 2a , T 1b ) is simultaneously higher than profits from a single bundle
T ∗l and the second-best offer when:










λsabL + (1− λ)sabH )
. (3.51)
Given that the second-best profit is at least equal to λp2a + (1− λ)(p∗h − VHa2), condition
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(3.51) is impossible to satisfy. Hence, it is never optimal to offer (T ∗l , T 2a , T 1b ) to the
consumer who follows the C(2) procedure.
Lemma 3 Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (2) procedure. Only
the following pricing strategies might be optimal: (1) a single bundle Ta or Tc, (2) two
bundles Ta and Tb, (3) three bundles Ta, Tc, and Td, (4) four bundles Ta, Tb, Tc, and Td.
Proof. For the proof, I consider possible combinations of potentially optimal bundles Ta,
Tb, Tc, and Td using the result of Lemma 4 that offering two bundles of the same type is
never optimal.
Single bundle: If the monopolist offers a single bundle, this bundle should extract
the whole surplus of one of the consumer types, that is, he chooses between bundles Ta
and Tc. To maximize the extracted surplus, the first-best level of consumption has to be
provided. This leads to Ta becoming equivalent to T ∗l and Tc becoming equivalent to T ∗h .
Two bundles: The only reasonable combination of two bundles offered to C(2)-
consumers is (Ta, Tb). If either of them is combined with another bundle, that bundle is
never chosen by any consumer. Also, offering two bundles (Tc, Td) does not bring anything
in addition to offering a single bundle Tc. When two bundles (Ta, Tb) are offered, it is
optimal to set them equivalent to the second-best bundles.
Three bundles: The θH-type chooses Tc only when he has it in the consideration
set together with Td. So, these two should be offered only together. Offering Tb and not
Tc might be optimal only when Ta is offered, and the monopolist needs a bundle that
would be incentive compatible with Ta for the θH-type. The only reasonable combination
of three bundles is, hence, (Ta, Tc, Td) such that Ta and Tc are the first-best bundles for
the θL- and θH-types, correspondingly.
Four bundles: Given the result of Lemma 4, the only possibility in this case is to
offer one bundle from each category.
Proposition 2 Assume that the consumer chooses according to the C (2) procedure.
It is optimal for the monopolist to offer dominated bundles T ∗h and Td only if the θH-type
is more likely to have only dominated bundles in his consideration set than the θL-type.
Proof. The claim made in the proposition implies that shdH > shdL when three bundles
T ∗l , T ∗h , and Td are offered, and rhdH > rhdL + rbdL + rbhL when four bundles Ta, Tb, T ∗h , and
Td are offered (to distinguish these two cases, I use sjki and r
jk
i for the corresponding
probabilities when three or four bundles are offered). The latter is the case because Tb
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is dominated for the θL-type. To prove the claim, I derive the necessary conditions for
pricing strategies (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) and (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be optimal.
(a) The necessary condition for (T ∗l , T
∗
h , Td) to be offered.






= [λ(slhL + s
ld
L )− (1− λ)(slhH + sldH)]p∗l + (1− λ)shdH p∗h, (3.52)
where slhi + sldi = 1 − shdi . The only difference from the profit from offering (T ∗l , T ∗h )
to the consumer who follows the C(1) choice procedure (see equation (3.27)) is that
the probability shdi replaces the probability shi . Correspondingly, the profit from offering
(T ∗l , T
∗













The condition (3.53) is no longer sufficient for the offer (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) to be the optimal
strategy because the comparison with the second-best profit is also required (see below).
However, this condition allows us to see that shdH > shdL is necessary for the offer (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td)
to be the optimal strategy. When (1− λ) p∗h = p∗l , this necessary condition also guarantees
that offering (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) is more profitable than offering a single bundle.
To derive the sufficient condition for the dominated bundles T ∗h and Td to be a part
of the optimal pricing strategy, I compare it with the second-best profit (3.18). Taking
into account conditions (3.19) and (3.20) that guarantee that offering two second-best
bundles is more profitable than offering a single bundle, I get the following restriction:
max{0, p∗l − (1− λ)p∗h} < λpSBl − (1− λ)V SBHl < (3.54)
(λ(1− shdL ) + (1− λ)(1− shdH ))p∗l − (1− shdH )(1− λ)p∗h.
Condition (3.53) that requires the profit from (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) to be higher than the profit
from offering a single bundle T ∗l or T ∗h is embedded in condition (3.54). Note that in the
special case when (1− λ) p∗h = p∗l , the condition (3.54) transforms to the following one:
0 < λpSBl − (1− λ)V SBHl < λp∗l (shdH − shdL ), (3.55)
which is, in general, possible to satisfy when the difference between shdH and shdL is large
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enough. This implies that the monopolist offers (T ∗l , T ∗h , Td) when the θH-type is suffi-
ciently more likely to have bundles T ∗h and Td in his consideration set than the θL-type.
(b) The necessary condition for (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be the optimal offered.






= (λra.L + (1− λ)(rahH + radH ))pa − (1− λ)rb.HVHa + (1− λ)(rhdH + rb.H)p∗h, (3.56)
where rjki is the probability that the θi-type has bundles j and k in his consideration
case when four bundles are offered (to avoid confusion with sjki , which is used when three




i for i = L,H. The θL-type buys the bundle Ta
when he has it in his consideration set, and buys nothing otherwise. The θH-type buys
the bundle Tb when he has it in his consideration set, buys the bundle Ta when he has
it and does not have Tb, and buys T ∗h in the remaining case. The bundle Tb has to be
incentive compatible with the bundle Ta for the θH-type. Hence, pb = p∗h−VHa, and there
is a corresponding downward distortion in qa.
The monopolist’s profit from the pricing strategy (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) is higher than his
profit from offering a single bundle T ∗l or T ∗h when the corresponding inequalities are
satisfied:
(1− λ)(rhdH + rb.H)p∗h > p∗l − A, (3.57)
(1− λ)(1− rhdH − rb.H)p∗h < A, (3.58)
where A = λra.L + (1− λ)(rahH + radH ),
The monopolist’s profit from the offer (T SBl , T SBh ) has the following lower bound:
πSB ≥ λpa + (1− λ)[p∗h − VHa], (3.59)
when he offers Ta instead of TSB, and hence, is not in the optimum. It follows that for
the pricing scheme (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be more profitable than (T SBl , T SBh ) at minimum,
the following condition should be satisfied:
(1− λ)(1− rhdH − rb.H)p∗h < A− λpa + (1− λ)VHa. (3.60)
This restriction is relevant when λpa > (1 − λ)VHa, and otherwise, the monopolist is







< (1− λ)p∗h <
min{A,A− λpa + (1− λ)VHa}
1− rhdH − rb.H
. (3.61)
From here, I get the necessary condition for the pricing strategy (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be more
profitable than T ∗l , T ∗h , and (T SBl , T SBh ). This condition is that the θL has dominated
bundles Tb, T ∗h , and Td in his consideration set with a lower probability than the θH-type
has in his dominated bundles T ∗h and Td, i.e. 1− ra.L < rhdH .
The sufficient condition for the pricing strategy (Ta, Tb, T ∗h , Td) to be more profitable
than T ∗l , T ∗h , and (T SBl , T SBh ) is similar to condition (3.61). The difference is that pa and
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